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Abstract 
The aim of the thesis is to investigate whether immigration from East and Central 
European countries to Great Britain has been politicised or taken one step further within 
the securitisation framework. The research conducted for this study relies on the 
Copenhagen School (CS) securitisation theory and links it to critical discourse analysis 
(CDA) for a more in-depth investigation of the linguistic manufacture of fear and 
insecurity. CDA allows to generate data on the underlying meanings, assumptions and 
ideologies behind textual productions. This is done within the context of the latest EU 
enlargements of 2004 and 2007. The time frame of the study thus extends from 2004 up 
until the present [2013] to include the possible repercussions of both enlargements 
within a considerable time frame. The integral focus of the study is on two British 
political parties- namely the Conservative Party, currently in coalition government with 
the Liberal Democrats; and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which is 
the fastest growing political party in the country. UKIP’s recent success in local 
elections indicate increasing discontent and concern among the wider public about the 
direction of the country with regard to issues such as immigration and relationship with 
the EU. For a more profound investigation John Kingdon’s “three streams model” is 
applied within the securitisation context; whereas Fairclough’s “three-dimensional 
framework” is employed to analyse the discursive construction of texts. The two 
separate models in different frameworks have several binding points, which add value 
and reliability to the study. The research paper argues that politicisation and calls for 
practical securitisation of ECE immigration take “place along the dimensions of social 
[and economic] welfare... and cultural identity” rather than racial and ethnic 
denominators (Ibryamova 2002: 3; Williams 2003).  
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1. Introduction 
The Copenhagen School
1
 has broadened the area of research in security from the 
traditional, state-centric conception of security in military terms to comprising five 
different sectors “each with their particular referent object and threat agenda” (Williams 
2003: 513). Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (1998) have added the 
political, economic, environmental and societal sectors, the latter of which has an 
integral focus in the thesis at hand. CS scholars have come up with a theory which 
“captures the structural and social dimensions embedded in language” (Trombetta 2011: 
148).  In the societal sector, “the identity of a group is presented as threatened by 
dynamics as diverse as cultural flows, economic integration, or population movements” 
(Williams 2003: 513). Therefore the crucial link between the immigration discourse of 
the British political elite and notions of insecurity and threat; economic instability; 
pressure on welfare and jobs; crime and violence; or an erosion of national solidarity 
and British identity is at the centre of the analytical focus of the study. Societal security, 
in short, refers to the survival of traditional values and identity of a community, or as 
Ole Wæver et al. (1993: 23) maintain that it “concerns the ability of a society to persist 
in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats”. With 
regard to immigration, defining these “possible” and “actual” threats, however, can be 
complicated since there is “no simple proportional formula for calculating when 
immigration becomes a threat” (Buzan in Waever et al. 1993: 43). Thus, borrowing one 
of the main assumptions from the securitisation theory, the study highlights that 
immigration from East and Central European countries does not become a (security) 
concern because it actually exerts existential negative influence on British values, 
norms; welfare and labour market, but because it has been presented as having such an 
influence through the discursive construction of language. Theiler (2009) has argued 
that societal security has objective and subjective markers, which are being selectively 
used by the British political elite to garner support for their policies and objectives. 
Objective markers indicate self-evident values such as traditional customs and language; 
                                                          
1
 The term “Copenhagen School” was coined by Bill McSweeney in the critical review essay “Identity 
and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School”(1996) Review of International Studies, vol. 2, no. 1, 
pp. 81-94 
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whereas subjective markers refer to what Karl Deutch (1957) has termed a “we-
feeling”, which emphasises “the fact that each nation perceives...social objective 
markers differently and assume the level of threat at very different stages” (Theiler 
2009: 106). Securitisation of an existential threat requires the mobilisation of “a 'we' 
against a supposedly threatening 'them'”, which might entail fabrications, manipulations 
and selective approach to the presentation of facts and figures to advance one’s success 
on a political path (Karyotis 2011: 16).  
In this context it is important to bear in mind that immigration might become an 
essential part of a country’s economic and social development. Since Great Britain is a 
nation gradually built on “multiple migration and crossbreeding processes”, it must be 
highlighted that often migrants and their cultural and societal qualities do not pose a 
threat in itself- “rather, it is the political exploitation of these cultural differences that 
confers a security dimension to immigration” (Karyotis 2011: 19). Peoples and 
Vaughan-Williams (2010: 136) argue that “competition between migrants and citizens 
of a host state for jobs, housing, and other resources can lead to enmity and 
intercommunal rivalry and violence”. This is further stoked by media and right-wing 
political parties. While the far-right British National Party (BNP) can be seen as 
internally incoherent, politically inaccurate and thus largely unsuccessul in the British 
political terrain, UKIP is increasingly gaining popular support due to its hard-lined 
rhetoric and arguably charismatic leader- Nigel Farage. Farage is also widely popular in 
the media (BBC, ITV, SKY News, Youtube) due to his fresh and entertaining attitude, 
which means he gets a very large amount of publicity for a leader of quite a small party.   
Immigrants can also be portrayed as a threat to public order, stability and national 
identity as well as a challenge to traditional patterns of living (Huysmans 2000; 
Karyotis 2011; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010). Karyotis (2011: 13) says that 
migrants from less wealthy European countries are attracted by the British welfare 
system and are therefore “believed to be 'plotting' to exploit national welfare provisions 
and available economic opportunities at the expense of citizens”. Thus migration can be 
linked to problems and even security threats, which “cut through a range of societal, 
criminological and economic arguments”- all of which will be addressed in the current 
study in the context of the CS politicisation/securitisation spectrum (Karyotis 2011: 19). 
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The research framework applied in the study combines linguistic and socio-political as 
well as cultural and historical elements that are all necessary for understanding the 
sentiments prevalent in contemporary Britain with regard to immigration from the East 
and Central European states. Analysing the topic from such various and spatially 
divergent contexts should offer an imperative backdrop for a thought-provoking 
research. The role of the media is also discussed, which pertains a considerable impact 
in swaying public opinion and which “further deepens the assessment of official 
discursive hegemony as well as the relationship between the political and the media 
more broadly” (Hansen 2006: 55). 
 
1.1. Purpose and Research Questions 
 
When it comes to defining politicisation and securitisation in the societal sector 
and more specifically in the context of migration, the spotlight has predominantly been 
on the migratory patterns of developing countries. Similarly, regional migration in the 
developed world with regard to security has been generally overshadowed by the 
notions of illegal migration and asylum. As Ibryamova puts it: “Immigration from the 
Central and Eastern European countries remains sidelined by the more conspicuous 
cases of racially, ethnically and religiously charged immigration from developing 
countries” (Ibryamova 2002: 3). Therefore the primary aim of this thesis is to address 
the eclipsed phenomenon of ECE migration to the UK and analyse whether the 
subsequent discursive construction of these migratory movements by the British 
political elite entail elements of threat and insecurity.  
The analysis attempts to examine the immigration effects of the 2004 and 2007 
enlargements of the European Union and its ramifications on British key social 
institutions such as the labour market and welfare state. The topic is even more 
intriguing as on 1 January 2014 Britain will lift labour restrictions for Bulgarian and 
Romanian nationals. This might result in a rapid inflow of A2 nationals, which might 
subsequently place “downward pressure on wages for the lowest paid” locals as well as 
threaten the jobs of other ECE nationals resulting in increased rates of crime and 
violence (Blinder 2013). Furthermore, the sentiments regarding the grave 
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miscalculations of the Labour Party in 2004 regarding the influx of A8 migrants and 
subsequent decision not to impose transitional measures on nationals from these states 
are still reflected in the immigration rhetoric of the political elite.  
To provide a more thought-provoking analysis of the discursive construction of 
insecurity posed by ECE immigration, the study attempts to thoroughly investigate the 
speeches and announcements delivered by the Conservative Party political elite and the 
United Kingdom Independence Party, which is considered to exert a considerable 
influence on the discursive development of the Conservative rhetoric (Parker 2013; 
Freedland 2013; Rawnsley 2013). This allows comparing and contrasting the speech 
acts and methods of the Conservative and UKIP politicians and subsequent proposals 
and changes to immigration legislation in the UK and within the wider context of the 
EU.  
Bearing in mind the outlined research aims, the research questions are formulated as 
follows:  
 
(1) Has the immigration from East and Central European countries to the UK 
been securitised by the Conservative Party and the United Kingdom 
Independence Party or is their rhetoric rather confined within the framework of 
politicisation? 
(2) Is the Conservative Party’s discursive construction of immigration rhetoric 
influenced by UKIP’s calls for practical securitisation? 
 
These questions require tracing the evolution of immigration patterns in the United 
Kingdom and attitudes towards multiculturalism more generally. Since “different states 
and nations have different thresholds for defining a threat” (Buzan et al. 1998: 30), it is 
an imperative task to assess the British historical and sociocultural context where the 
processes of politicisation and securitisation take place. The research paper argues that 
the UK does not only have a strained relationship with the EU as an institution that is 
perceived to undermine British sovereign rights and values, but also in the societal 
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domain with the post-communist space, which has been part of the hostile “Other” for 
decades, thus contributing to the ECE immigration rhetoric (Mitsilegas et al. 2003; 
Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010). 
 
1.2. Delimitations and Clarifications 
  
Before moving on to the contextual framework of the thesis, necessary delimitations 
and clarifications need to be addressed for a more thorough and comprehensive 
research.  
The term “migrant” is normally perceived as self-evident, without the further need of 
explanation. With regard to different nations and contexts as well as to the main focus 
of the study at hand, however, the term needs some further clarification. Among the 
wider public and policy-makers as well as in “government documentation and research2, 
a migrant is often defined as 'foreign born'” (Anderson 2010: 104). The term “foreign 
born” , however, can indicate a British citizen born outside Great Britain. Therefore it 
must be highlighted that in the current study, migrants refer to foreign-born nationals, 
who are the citizens of their country of birth. More specifically, the research paper is 
interested in migrants, who are European nationals
3
.  
With regard to the societal focus of the research and frequent allusion to the “British 
identity” and the values of “British nationals”, the latter concept needs to be delineated. 
British Nationality Law (1981-1983)
4
 differentiates between six types of British 
nationals: British citizens, British Overseas Territories Citizens (BOTC), British 
Overseas Citizens (BOC), British subjects, British Nationals (Overseas) (BNO) and 
British Protected Persons (BPP) (www.homeoffice.gov.uk). British  nationals in this 
context exclude the five latter categories and focus on the “British citizens” category, 
whether those born in the UK, born overseas to at least one British parent (British 
                                                          
 
2
 See, for example, UK’s Migration Advisory Committee (MAC)- a body of economists tasked to advise 
the government on immigration (Anderson 2010: 104) 
3
 In addition to the 'European national' category, the most commonly used migration categories are: Non 
EEA Labour Migrants, Non EEA Students, Family members, Young People on the Youth Mobility 
scheme, Refugees, Asylum seekers and Refused asylum seekers (Spencer and Pobjoy 2011: 15-16). 
4
 “The originality of the British System was the lack of a national citizenship until 1981” when the British 
Nationality Act 1981 was ratified (Voicu 2009: 71). 
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citizenship may descend to one generation born abroad) or born in Britain and then 
moved overseas. The category in this particular study excludes first and second 
generation immigrants, whether citizens of Great Britain or not.  
The terms “(in)flow”, “influx” and “immigration” refer to migrants entering the 
country; “outflow” and “emigration” to migrants leaving the country; “net migration” 
indicates the balance between these figures.  
The term “(im)migrants” are used when the statements presented could be applied more 
broadly, not just within the context of East and Central Europe. When the regional 
context is predominant, it will be explicitly defined so- namely “ECE (im)migrants”.  
The term “ECE” in general refers to the former socialist countries in the East and 
Central Europe. Since the focus of the current study is narrowed down and placed 
within the context of the latest EU enlargements, ECE countries here indicate A8 
countries
5
 that joined the EU in 2004 and A2 countries
6
 that joined in 2007.  
The main aim of the research paper is to investigate the discursive constructions of ECE 
immigration to Great Britain within the politicisation/securitisation spectrum. Thus, the 
actual numbers of migrant inflow from ECE states and its percentage of the total inflow 
of immigrants to the UK is not the integral focus of the study. The study is interested in 
how these inflows are constructed through linguistic manufacture and subsequently 
presented to the audience. The overall idea of the ECE immigration figures, however, 
are presented in paragraph 1.6 for the general backdrop of the study.  
 
1.3. East versus West- The Influence of Historical Enmity and Incongruity 
 
Jef Huysmans argues that “the differentiation between the self and the other” is one of 
the main starting assumptions when trying to analyse the politicisation and 
securitisation of an issue (Huysmans 2006: 49). He makes an important remark essential 
to the current study that securitiation logic identifies “what is hostile to the unity rather 
than on structuring the substance of the unity itself” (Huysmans 2006: 50). This means 
                                                          
5
 Comprising Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia 
6
 Comprising Bulgaria and Romania 
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that immigration is discursively constructed and subsequently presented as the main 
force behind the failures of a state benefit system, health service or unemployment, 
rather than tackling the problem from inside. Thus the analysis of Britain in the wider 
regional complex is imperative for a more in-depth research.  
Ibryamova argues that during the Cold War there was almost no “interaction between 
the two halves of Europe, giving Eastern Europe only a peripheral place in the West 
European public consciousness” (Ibryamova 2002: 7). With the demise of the Soviet 
Union,  the East and Central European rose from the communist debris and “undertook 
a process of political and economic transformation” to become part of the Western clubs 
such as EU and NATO (Ibryamova 2002: 7). Yet, as Fierke (1999: 12) describes, these 
countries instantly adopted an inferior stance and presented themselves as “new born” 
and “fragile” democracies. Mälksoo (2009: 663) adds that this kind of self-perception 
and self-presentation as victims gives post-communist states “the right to complain, 
protest and make demands” which places Western European states in an uncomfortable 
position and at the same time deepens the “liminal Europeanness” of the former Eastern 
bloc. Ibryamova similarly highlights the notions of “the abandoned Eastern Europe” and 
“the myth of Yalta”7, which are supposed to evoke “sense of guilt” and a kind of 
“historical responsibility” towards the countries of East and Central Europe and provoke 
a sense of “kinship duty” of belonging to the same entity (Ibryamova 2002: 8).  
The British imperial past, successful war history, national pride and geographical 
location as an island nation (often explicitly highlighted in immigration speeches, e.g. 
Cameron 2013c; Howard 2005b) allows it to claim the label “exceptional”. Historians 
who specialise on British national identity (e.g. Linda Colley, Tom Nairn) have argued 
that the core of British identity “is shaped by recurring wars (especially with France), 
the Protestant religion... the image of Britain as an empire builder” and one of the 
leading nations in the world- sentiments, which are still echoed in one form or another 
in contemporary British politics (Saggar and Somerville 2012: 6). This can be noted in 
current British immigration discourse, which increasingly presents Britain as a 
                                                          
7
 “The myth of Yalta” refers to the Yalta Conference held in February 1945 where Winston Churchill, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and Jossif Stalin agreed to divide Europe into spheres of interest and decide upon 
the faith of East and Central Europe conceding it to Stalin. For more, see F.A.M. Alting on Geusau (1992) 
Beyond Containment and Division: Western Cooperation from a Post-Totalitarian Perspective, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 
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“reluctant receiver of its Eastern and Central European 'kin'” (e.g. increasing 
propositions for negative advertising campaigns
8
 and for the modification of EU 
regulations) due to economic and social dislocations as a possible accompanying effect 
(Ibryamova 2002: 9). Furthermore, the “Eastern and Balkan routes” [and increasingly 
southeastern routes] are presented as the main routes of “illegal immigration into the 
EU” and thus a destabilising force by some of the West European states (Mitsilegas et 
al. 2003: 127).  
Peoples and Vaughan-Williams rightly note that “certain issues and objects are easier to 
securitise [and politicise] than others depending on the associated connotations” 
(Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010: 79). Thus the politicisation/securitisation logic 
of ECE immigration to Britain can be associated with historical enmity and the 
belonging of these countries to the sphere of the hostile “Other” in the past. Migrants 
from East and Central Europe can therefore be presented as a concern [on occasion as a 
threat] to the traditional existence of a British “way of life” and conception of national 
identity. Estonian politician and historian Mart Laar has pointed out that there is and 
always will be an inevitable gap between the East and West European countries, which 
eliminates the possibility for any grander social and political integration than we 
currently have- this is stemmed in ideology, memory and history (Laar 2012).  
 
1.4 United Kingdom versus the European Union - The Strained Relationship 
 
The European issue has always been emotionally and politically charged for Britain- 
one just needs to think about the debates over the adoption of Euro; opt-outs in the key 
areas of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the free movement of people; 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty; ERM (European Exchange Rate Mechanism) and 
the Black Wednesday
9
; or the British membership of the Union itself, which was 
                                                          
8
 See, for example, “Negative ads about Britain: it’s not as if we’re short of material”, The Guardian, 28 
January 2013 or  “Immigration: Romanian or Bulgarian? You won’t like it here”, The Guardian, 27 
January 2013. 
9
 Refers to the date (16 September 1992) when the British Conservative government had to withdraw the 
pound sterling from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). 
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initially vetoed twice by French president Charles de Gaulle, “on the grounds that 
Britain was hostile to European integration” (Watt 2013b). 
British Euroscepticism has received considerable academic attention and Britain’s 
relationship with the EU has been described by various scholars as “reluctant” (Geddes 
2004; Gifford 2008), “semi-detached” (George 1998; Bulmer 1992) and most 
notoriously by George (1994; 1998) as “awkward”. These observations can be put on 
the account of Britain’s self-perception as “exceptional” in comparison to mainland 
Europe, which “describes how Great Britain- by virtue of its history and culture- is 
uniquely disposed to act as an example to the world” (Pram Gad 2011: 60).  Buonfino 
(2004a: 5) argues that during the Conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher and 
John Major, for example, “Europe was seen in.. direct contrast with Britain”. Thatcher’s 
infamous Bruges speech of 1988 denounced “federalism” and aggressively defended the 
nation-state, while provoking internal political turmoil within the Conservative Party 
about Britain’s place in Europe (Young 1998; Bache and Jordan 2006). These 
sentiments must be borne in mind when analysing Britain’s stance towards immigration 
emanating from continental Europe, as well as in the context of the past and future EU 
enlargements and fluctuations in immigration policies. It can be argued that even 
opening the British labour market to A8 nationals without any restrictions (apart from 
the Workers Registration Scheme- WRS) was due to “self-interested bargaining” 
deriving from “self-maximising behaviour” in the hope of hosting the crème de la 
crème of the ECE labour force (Ibryamova 2002). 
The core of European Union policy is based on four freedoms: goods, capital, services 
and people- the last of which has become a source of heated debates and controversy, 
since people from nations with lower GDPs use the freedom to migrate to richer 
nations, thus contributing to “lower per-person funding of public services” and 
challenging the welfare system (Saggar and Somerville 2012: 10). There are already 
(and gradually increasing) sentiments of concern and uncertainty about the influx of 
ECE migrants and politicians from all camps are growing progressively vocal in 
fuelling and perpetuating these feelings through addressing the “undesirable economic 
and social impacts caused by the unchecked flows of immigrants” (Ibryamova 2002: 
12). In addition, the restrictions to A2 nationals “will be lifted at a time when there is an 
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increasing political tension over Britain’s relationship with Europe” (Barrett and 
Freeman 2012). The contextual framework provides a significant backdrop to 
explaining the reasons behind politicisation and practical attempts of securitisation of 
ECE migrants in the UK. 
Due to this “British mindset” towards the “European project”, Buonfino argues that 
while selling the idea of close integration and cooperation to the British public might 
prove to be complicated, the political elite could, however, “argue for a different role 
for Britain, not at the margins as it used to be but leading European developments” 
(Buonfino 2004a: 9; Buonfino 2004b). This was perhaps most evident during the New 
Labour, which actively employed “one of the favourite elements in British 
discourse...that of the leadership” (Buonfino 2004a: 9).  
While analysing the relationship between Europe and the United Kingdom, Barry 
Buzan and Ole Wæver’s levels of analysis10 provide an amplifying vantage point. On 
the unit level Europe remains “the Other”, but constructive Other, especially when it 
comes to fighting a common challenge inter-governmentally (Buonfino 2004a: 15). But 
this is the level, where Europe can also be described as the destabilising “Other”, due to 
its far-reaching regulations and arguable corrosive effects on British democracy. On the 
level of international (sub)systems, however, Europe is “self”- the context where close 
cooperation is emphasised and common policies are worked upon.  The study at hand 
regards both levels- the former with regard to hostile sentiments towards ECE 
migration; the latter in the context of EU legislation and regulations, which place limits 
on British migration policies and discourse. 
1.5 East and Central European Immigration to the United Kingdom- the General 
Backdrop 
 
Multiculturalism
11
 has been gradually adopted as the official national policy of Great 
Britain ever since Roy Jenkins, the Home Secretary from 1965 to 1967, rejected the 
                                                          
10
 “In the study of International Relations, the five most frequently used levels of analysis are: 
international systems, international subsystems, units, subunits and individuals” (Buzan et al. 1998: 5-6). 
11
 Multiculturalism means “that immgrants should be able to participate as equals in all speheres of 
society, without being expected to give up their own culture, religion and language, although usually with 
an expectation of conformity to certain key values” (Castles and Miller 2009: 248).  
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assimilationist politics and declared the new ideal that came to be known as 
“multiculturalism” by stating that the Labour Government no longer sought “a 
flattening process of uniformity, but cultural diversity, coupled with equal opportunity 
in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance” (Jenkins as cited in Lloyd 2002). The future for 
immigrants and the next generation laid in embracing a common public sphere of shared 
norms and values with equal opportunities. This ideal, however, was disturbed by 
gradually increasing sentiments of national distress, fear over the loss of British 
identity, national tradition and societal homogeneity (Huysmans 2000). Over forty years 
later, David Cameron attacked Britain’s decades-old policy of multiculturalism and 
claimed it encourages “segregated communities” (Cameron 2011).  
ECE migration has been the subject of a relatively confined rhetoric in Great Britain as 
it has always been overshadowed by the migratory patterns of workers from the New 
Commonwealth (former British colonies in the Caribbean, the Indian subcontinent and 
Africa) (Castles and Miller 2009). The immigration discourse was predominantly 
“racially, ethnically and religiously charged” with perhaps the most notorious example 
being the Shadow Defence Secretary Enoch Powell’s “Rivers of Blood” speech in 1968, 
just two years after Jenkins’ declaration (Ibryamova 2002: 3). While the integral 
concern of Powell’s speech were non-white immigrants from former British colonies, it 
was an explosive speech “stoking the fear of British society under threat from outsiders” 
(Trujillo 2013). One could argue that there are undebatable echoes of Enoch Powell in 
contemporary British immigration discourse. Today the main source of concern, with 
regard to ECE migration, is along the lines of social welfare and labour market. Powell 
(1968), similarly, expressed concern for British nationals being made “strangers in their 
own country” not being able to get jobs, “obtain school places” and seeing their 
“neighbourhoods changed beyond recognition”, which is also expressively articulated 
by UKIP leader Nigel Farage, but increasingly also by other political figures in the 
country.  
The EU enlargement of 2004 brought in 10 member states, while the expansion of 2007 
added Romania and Bulgaria. The Labour government decided not to impose 
transitional measures on the countries which joined in 2004 underestimating the number 
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of inflow to just 5000-13 000 per year from these states (Castle and Cowell 2013). “The 
numbers enrolling in the government’s worker registration scheme (WRS)”, the only  
requirement placed on A8 migrants to be able to legally work in the UK, “totalled 90 
950 between May and September 2004” (Geddes 2005: 728). By 30 June 2006, this 
number reached almost half a million (427 000) (Castles and Miller 2009: 115). Due to 
“significant disparities in wage levels” East and Central Europe became one of the main 
sources of migrants to the UK and “nationals from these states now constitute some of 
the largest foreign-born populations in the country” (McCollum and Findlay 2012: 1). 
As a result of these grave miscalculations and unexpected numbers of influx, the Labour 
government became an easy target for the media, the Conservative Party, UKIP, the 
BNP and the wider British public, which led to the decision “to opt out of free 
movement for workers from Bulgaria and Romania in 2007” (Castles and Miller 2009: 
116). Immigration restrictions to the lastly joined members, however, will be lifted on 1 
January 2014, which has generated a plethora of new concerns about the increasing 
inflow of migrants from these two countries. Although the situation is completely 
different than it was in 2004, since all EU countries open their labour markets to 
Bulgaria and Romania at the same time, the experience of previous EU expansion and 
the overall sense of insecurity and unawareness is prevalent, which performs as a fuel 
for right-wing politicians. There are increasing concerns among the British public that 
Romanians and Bulgarians will be the new Poles and Lithuanians, taking over the 
British labour market, which has subsequently created rhetorical opposition to British 
open-door policy (The Economist 2006). Furthermore, the current economic climate is 
different than in 2004 due to large-scale youth unemployment and fears about the 
“triple-dip”12 recession highly featured in the media. Hence, A2 immigration is seen as 
something that will not help the problems of unemployment in general and youth 
unemployment in particular.   
 
                                                          
12
 Refers to the fact that UK is in danger of entering a third period of recession since 2008. See, for 
example, “Will Britain slide into a triple-dip recession?”, The Guardian, 22 April 2013 
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Figure 1 
Source: Migration Statistics Quarterly Report, November 2012, p. 13, Office for National Statistics 
 
Castles and Miller (2009: 110) emphasise that Great Britain “had its highest-ever inflow 
in 2004- 494 000 persons- and net migration was 202 000”. The sudden surge was 
largely influenced by the EU enlargement of 2004. Since then, immigration from ECE 
states has gradually become “the focus of debate in the public, media and political 
arenas” (McCollum and Findlay 2012: 38). As seen from Figure 1, the inflow of A8 
migrants reached its peak in 2007; the same year when Bulgaria and Romania joined the 
EU. When the financial crisis hit the country, net migration dropped dramatically. This, 
however, was not reflected in the rhetoric of the political elite of the country, who found 
a perfect pretext in the face of recession to blame the migrants and subsequently 
provided a solid ground for UKIP to build its assertive campaign.  
Thus the contemporary integration and immigration challenge in the UK is not centred 
on racial and ethnic denominators- “the...recent experience involving large-scale white 
migration from Eastern European sources has created a substantially different framing 
context for integration” (Saggar and Somerville 2012: 10). This context highlights the 
“semi-detached” relationship between the UK and the EU, where British “immigration 
exceptionalism has been challenged by policy objectives and interdependencies that link 
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Britain with other EU member states” (Geddes 2005: 731). This can be illustrated with 
British opt-outs from the Schengen Agreement. While at first Britain and Ireland 
refused to join completely, “insisting on their own stricter border controls of people 
coming from the continent”, they “eventually agreed to take part in some aspects of the 
Agreement” such as the Schengen Information System (SIS) (Castles and Miller 2009: 
198). Similarly, the recent proposals by David Cameron (Cameron 2013c) such as the 
more robust residence tests for EU migrants and limits on their access to benefits are not 
necessarily against the free movement clause of the EU but once again presents Great 
Britain as the odd one out among the other EU countries with regard to migration 
policies for EU and EEA nationals.  
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2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1. Securitisation Theory 
 
The integral focus of the study derives from the Copenhagen School securitisation 
theory, especially associated with Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap De Wilde13, and 
which rests on the notion developed by J. L. Austin that security is a “speech act” 
(Austin 1962; Buzan et al. 1998; Laustsen and Wæver 2000). Austin has emphasised the 
idea that “each sentence can convey three types of acts, the combination of which 
constitutes the total speech act situation”: locutionary, illocutionary and 
perlocutionary
14
 (Balzacq 2011: 5; Balzacq 2005: 175). Thus it means that the focal 
point of securitisation theory is on the function of language- an issue becomes a security 
threat through the discursive construction of linguistic attributes. Speech acts are 
“performatives”, which assume that “an issue becomes a matter of security when it 
presented as such, not necessarily because in reality it exists as such” (Ibryamova 2002: 
4). Therefore the process of securitisation relies heavily on the notions of persuasion, 
bargaining and linguistic competence (Balzacq 2005). The reason behind such a strong 
focus on the performative aspect of the speech lies in the assumption that for a 
successful securitisation, it must be accepted by the audience (Buzan et al. 1998). 
Therefore it is an imperative task for any securitising actor to “tune to the level of the 
audience” and “identify with the audience’s feelings, needs and interests” (Balzacq 
2005: 184). To gain more ground and leverage among the audience, the speech acts “use 
various artefacts such as metaphors, emotions, stereotypes, gestures, silence and even 
lies to reach its goals and sound persuasive” (Balzacq 2011: 2).  Therefore the actual 
discursive inclusion of the word “security” is not even essential since Hansen (2012: 
533) maintains that “securitising actors may reconstitute an issue such that it avoids the 
high-pitched nodes of radical, barbaric, blood-thirsty 'Others', while still situating it 
within a modality of securitisation”. For an illustrative example, Hansen draws attention 
to migration discourse which often deliberately avoids hard-edged rhetoric where 
                                                          
13
 “the securitization concept first entered International Relations vernacular after being outlined by Ole 
Wæver (1995) in the mid-1990s, and received its fullest treatment in the 1998 book Security: A New 
Framework for Analysis” by Buzan,  Wæver and de Wilde (McDonald 2008: 566).  
14
 “locutionary- the utterance of an expression that contains a given sense and reference; illocutionary- the 
act performed in articulating a locution; perlocutionary- which is the consequentialist effects or sequels 
that are aimed to evoke the feelings, beliefs, thoughts or actions of the target audience” (Balzacq 2011: 5). 
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immigrants are “threats” to abstain from invoking hatred among the minority groups 
and instead opts for implicit references to security such as saying that they are “better 
helped by their own environments” (highly featured in Cameron 2013c) (Hansen 2012: 
533). Furthermore, focusing on the negative aspects of immigration and openly 
depicting this phenomenon as a “security risk”, will make it considerably more difficult 
to “justify economically beneficial labour migration” (Boswell 2007: 2). This is 
particularly prevalent in British Prime Minister David Cameron’s speeches. Since he is 
considerably more constrained in his rhetoric due to his position as a Prime Minister 
and leader of the Conservative Party than for example UKIP leader Nigel Farage, he 
always relies on extreme “political correctness” and linguistic balance. Thus all of 
Cameron’s public statements on immigration have incorporated the beneficial aspects of 
immigration, whereas Farage has often explicitly focused on the negative aspects to 
induce a sense of heightened priority and tension. Cameron’s discourse also usually 
oscillates between different themes in a coherent manner, indicating the intense thought 
put into discursive construction to satisfy the largest proportion of the public. 
Huysmans (2006) draws attention to several ways how to construct linguistic practices 
to securitise migration. He maintains that it can be done by highlighting numerical 
values as people respond to numbers “much more vigorously...than to an abstract claim” 
(Huysmans 2006: 47). Another tactic is to use strong metaphors, such as “flood” and 
“invasion”, which are perceived to increase heightened concern and will be further 
elaborated upon in the methodology section. Securitising actors can also highlight the 
characteristic features and stereotypes of migrants, most notorious examples being the 
derogatory terms “Polish plumber” and the “Romanian beggar”. The reasons behind 
such linguistic constructions have several aims including “winning the support” of 
neutral voters, ensuring the support base that an issue is being dealt with in a rigorous 
manner and “persuading or daunting the opposition”, where UKIP comes into play 
(Vultee 2011: 84). Derogating or patronising the minorities is an important rhetorical 
tactic, however, as van Dijk argues, “the overall strategy of most of the minority 
discourse is to emphasise the positive properties of us” in a stark contrast to “the 
negative discourse of them”, which is evident in the British “exceptionalism” rhetoric 
(van Dijk 1993: 105). Thus, in general, “securitisation works on the basis of 
'insecuring'” (Huysmans 2006: 61). This means that to join nationals of a country for a 
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common cause it is essential to first create a sense of insecurity in the community to 
justify the adoption of emergency measures and the expansion of powers to deal with 
the issue (Trujillo 2013; Huysmans 2006; Boswell 2007). Thus the basic idea behind 
securitisation theory is that a referent object (RO) is presented (through discursive 
construction) to be threatened by an existential threat (ET) and this is brought to the 
attention of the audience (A) by a securitising actor (SA) who practices securitising 
moves
15
 to achieve expected results (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 
Source: Huysmans, J. (1998) “Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security 
Studies Agenda in Europe”, p. 494 
 
For the main architects of the theory, therefore, the central concept of “securitisation” 
has negative connotation, since it indicates a “failure to deal with issues as normal 
politics” (Buzan et al. 1998: 29). Therefore the notion of “desecuritisation” is 
introduced, which deals with issues within the domain of normal politics and suggests a 
move from the securitised to the politicised or in other words out of “threat-defence 
sequence” (Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998: 29). Rita Floyd, however, argues against 
                                                          
15
 Securitising move is  “a  discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat 
to a referent object”. It alone “does not...create securitisation. The issue is securitised only if and when the 
audience accepts it as such” (Buzan et al. 1998: 25). 
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the negativity of the concept as well as against the Welsh School
16
 theorists, who 
maintain that securitisation is a positive phemonenon due to its emphasis on 
emancipation and freeing “people from the physical and human constraints providing 
them with true human security” and rather emphasises that it is “issue-dependent” 
(Floyd 2007: 328, 335). 
To produce a resourceful analysis of the British political elite’s security discourse, one 
should first define the concepts of politicisation and securitisation in relation to each 
other. Here, Buzan et al. (1998: 23) provide a substantial vantage point: “Securitisation 
can be seen as a more extreme version of politicisation”. The authors have proposed a 
spectrum ranging from nonpoliticised, where the matter is not discussed within the 
public domain and is not even a matter of public concern; to politicised, where the issue 
is “part of public policy, requiring government decision”; to securitised, where the issue 
is “either a special kind of politics or above politics” and “presented as an existential 
threat requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds 
of political procedure” (Figure 3) (Buzan et al. 1998: 23-24).  
 
Figure 3 The securitisation “spectrum” 
Source: Peoples, C. and Vaughan-Williams, N. (2010) Critical Security Studies: An Introduction, p. 77 
 
 
Peoples and Vaughan-Williams (2010) have contested the clear-cut division of 
“politicised” and “securitised” and argue whether these concepts can be treated as 
distinct separates. They draw upon  several authors (Acharya 2006; Abrahamsen 2005; 
Williams 2003) who maintain that very often “issues move only very gradually from 
'normalcy' to 'emergency', and are usually conceived of as 'security risks' rather than 
existential threats in between these two stages” (Peoples and Vaughan Williams 2010: 
86). The question of what constitutes normal politics and when can we start considering 
an issue outside that domain is problematic.  Sometimes exceptions to everyday policy-
making “actually define normal day-to-day workings of politics” and cannot be 
regarded as a move to the security domain (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010: 86). 
                                                          
16
 Predominantly linked to Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones, who challenged the the definition of 
security in purely military terms and and “instead linked the study of security to the exapansive goal of 
human emancipation” (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010: 9).  
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This is also important with regard to the current study, since UKIP and Conservative 
Party rhetoric cannot always be seen belonging to the politicised or the securitised 
sphere, but as a fluctuation on the spectrum. Therefore, while the research paper argues 
that the Conservative Party would overall be located within the politicisation domain 
with regard to its discursive construction of ECE immigration rhetoric, UKIP would be 
placed slightly further, just on the borderline of securitisation; at the same time with 
regard to recent developments in the British political sphere and the lifting of labour 
market restrictions to Bulgarian and Romanian nationals in 2014, the Conservative 
Party’s rhetoric has seen a gradual shift towards a more rigorous stance, which on 
occasion might be argued to be on the borderline of securitisation. 
 
The concept of “emergency measures”, however, is problematic and needs to be further 
elaborated upon. Buzan et al. (1998) mention that a referent object (in the societal sector 
a larger societal group joined by cultural and historical values, in this case British 
nationals) must be existentially threatened (by ECE immigrants) and this is brought to 
the public attention by securitising actors (British political elite, the members of the 
Conservative Party and UKIP), thus justifying the adoption of emergency measures to 
deal with the existential threat. At the same time Buzan et al. (1998: 25) maintain that: 
We do not push the demand so high as to say that an emergency measure 
has to be adopted, only that the existential threat has to be argued and just 
gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible 
to legitimize emergency measures (Buzan et a. 1998: 25) 
Therefore one must highlight that applying emergency measures to break away from the 
context of everyday politics is not a facilitating condition for a successful securitisation. 
The only prerequisite in this regard is a discursively constructed heightened sense of 
urgency, which creates a platform “from which it is 'possible' to legitimise emergency 
measures”; “while acting [and] actually putting to use such extraordinary means” is a 
completely different matter (Roe 2008: 621). Gordon Brown’s “British jobs for British 
workers”-campaign could be one of the illustrative examples, which David Cameron 
himself deemed unlawful and “illegal under EU law” (Cameron 2007). Yet, he made 
proposals in his latest immigration speech to limit EU migrants’ access to the British 
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benefit system, which might “put the UK at odds with the EU over restrictions on free 
movement of workers” (Cameron 2013; Wintour 2013). These proposals and 
“limitations on otherwise inviolable rights” can be seen as creating a platform for 
securitisation, while the actual measures might not even be implemented (Buzan et al. 
1998: 24). While the adoption of emergency measures might not be essential, Salter 
(2011: 121) argues that some kind of public policy change is an integral criteria of 
successful securitisation, “either in discourse, budget, or in actual policy”, which will be 
more closely looked at in the empirical section of the study.  
Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde’s original framework has been contested, expanded and 
supplemented over the last decade, and perhaps most important contributions have 
come from Thierry Balzacq. Buzan et al. (1998) differentiate between three units of 
analysis, which are referent objects, securitising actors and functional actors
17
 (p. 36). 
Balzacq, however, has decided to broaden this framework and mentions that these three 
units all fall within one level of analysis, namely that of the agent- “it does not integrate 
two equally important elements...acts and context” (Balzacq 2011: 35, Balzacq 2009). 
Therefore he adds two more levels of analysis (Figure 4), the level of the act and the 
contextual level- the former incorporates discursive and non-discursive practices such as 
heuristic artefacts, dispositif
18
, grammar and policies generated by securitisation, 
whereas the latter maintains that discourse is “contextually enabled and constrained” 
and thus one needs “a thorough understanding of the context of the discourse” (Balzacq 
2011: 35-36). The differentiation between distal and proximate contexts are also 
important. The former refers to the “macro-environment of the securitising move” or the 
“broader historical and sociocultural context in which the securitising move is 
embedded”- in terms of Great Britain’s “exceptionalism”, imperial past and relationship 
with the EU- whereas the latter addresses the “micro-environment of the securitising 
move” or the immediate setting of the discourse like the stage, the genre and the 
audience (Wilkinson 2011: 98; Balzacq 2011: 37). Balzacq also adds the analysis of the 
audience reception to the original three units of analysis (agent level).  Since the current 
                                                          
17
 “Actors who affect the dynamics of a sector. Without being the referent object or the actor calling for 
security on behalf of the referent object, this is an actor who significantly influences decisions in the field 
of security” (Buzan et al. 1998: 36). 
18
 Dispositif is a “thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural 
forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and 
philantropic propositions” (Foucault 1980: 194 as cited in Balzacq 2011: 29). 
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study is not confined to the level of the agent, but also regards the methods of discursive 
construction and sociocultural context, Balzacq’s (2011) vocabulary of securitisation 
must be borne in mind.  
 
Figure 4 Balzacq’s vocabulary of securitisation 
Source: Balzacq, T. (2011) Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, pp. 36 
 
The Copenhagen School perspective is not looking to provide a completely new 
framework for security analysis, but rather supplement and expand the earlier, 
traditional military focus of security and provide a broader agenda for research. It 
contests the traditionalist perspective, which “objectively declares what 'real' threats 
are” and highlights the importance of investigating how security issues are constructed 
in the first place (Charrett 2009: 17-18). Therefore in addition to the military sector of 
security, Buzan (1991) has formulated four additional sectors for security analysis: the 
environmental, the economic, the political and the societal sector- the latter of which 
provides a framework for the study at hand. The authors argue that “the organising 
concept in the societal sector is identity” and thus the referent objects are predominantly 
larger societal groups that “carry the loyalties and devotion of subjects in a form and to 
a degree that can create a socially powerful argument that this 'we' [along with its 
traditional ways of life] is threatened” (Buzan et al. 1998: 123). The most common 
existential threats in this sector run along the horizontal (“overriding cultural and 
linguistic influence”) or vertical lines (there is a threat from an integrating project such 
as the EU) or in the context of migration (Buzan et al. 1998: 121). UKIP has always 
 26 
 
vigorously campaigned in all three spheres (with regard to dissatisfation with the EU, 
(ECE) migration and the potential threat to national solidarity and identity emanating 
from immigration); whereas the Conservative Party has been more subtle in its rhetoric 
and been mainly confined to the migration sphere and rather passively in the vertical 
sphere (until recent developments regarding Cameron’s EU referendum).  
It is important to note that when securitisation is not completed (i.e. issues are not lifted 
above ordinary politics or there is no audience consent), it is still relevant from the 
perspective of security analysis. Securitising moves as just as important for a researcher, 
since they indicate some kind of social instability, the development of social attitudes 
and give an idea about the future course of security politics (Buzan et al. 1998; Laustsen 
and Wæver 2000). Another important feature to be mentioned- before addressing one of 
the most underdeveloped concept of securitisation, namely that of the audience- is that 
the securitisation perspective also allows to securitise “the absence of securitisation”, 
which should be looked at in the context of the Conservative Party and UKIP mutual 
relationship (Buzan et al. 1998: 40). UKIP is the fastest growing political party in the 
country and this is largely due to addressing the other parties’ soft approach to 
immigration (Birrell 2013) 
  
2.2. Audience in Securitisation Theory 
 
It was already established that securitisation is deemed completed and successful if the 
discursive construction of a threat is accepted by significant portions of society i.e. the 
audience. However, while in general it is evident who the securitising actors are 
(political elite, pressure groups, bureaucracies, governments), the audience itself 
remains a fundamentally underdeveloped concept in the CS securitisation theory (Salter 
2008; Balzacq 2011). Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) make no mention of who 
actually constitutes an audience or what does the acceptance by the audience entail. 
Therefore the concept has been developed further by other authors (e.g. Salter 2011; 
Hansen 2006; Roe 2008; Leonard and Kaunert 2011; Williams 2011) who argue that in 
general there are different settings of securitisation and therefore different threat 
rhetorics resonate with different audiences. As Salter argues: “It is over-simplistic to 
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describe one securitiser and one audience- one message and one decision” (Salter 2011: 
117). Similarly it is too simplistic to draw a rigid line between successful and 
unsuccessful securitisation, since the process might be completed in one setting and not 
in others and thus should be considered “as a threshold rather than a binary” (Salter 
2011: 119).  
At this point, some of the most fruitful approaches to the conceptualisation and 
operationalisation of the concept of audience should be discussed. Salter has proposed a 
dramaturgical approach and subsequently four different settings (the popular, the elite, 
the technocratic and the scientific) for investigating the role of the audience in a 
securitisation process since “different settings operate on different logics of persuasion, 
different epistemologies and power/knowledge networks” (Salter 2011: 122). Thus all 
settings comprise of different audiences, who respond to security matters in a different 
way. There are also several considerations that must be borne in mind and which might 
affect the overall outcome of securitisation, such as the general conception that the 
wider public tends to have a short memory, politicians aim at the next election cycle, 
bureaucrats are risk averse and scientists might neglect the dynamics of everyday life 
and routine (Salter 2008). With regard to migration, for example, in one setting it might 
be just politicised, whereas in the other it has already entered the realm of security- “just 
as there are different national and psycho-cultural contexts- so too are there different 
sociological, political, bureaucratic, and organisational contexts within a populace” 
(Salter 2008: 326). The most interesting characteristic of this approach is that is uses 
“the vocabulary of the theatre” (e.g. “social settings, roles and performances of 
identity”, actors and audience) (Salter 2008: 328). Thus actors and their roles are under 
observation in the dramaturgical approach and how the language of the actors changes 
according to different roles and settings to gain the utmost effect and reception.  
Another considerable approach has been suggested by Roe (2008) who distinguishes 
between the moral and formal support and argues that for a successful securitisation the 
securitising actor requires “moral support both from the general public and from 
relevant institutional bodies” as well as the “formal support of the institution [the 
parliament] that actually sanctions the use of force” (Roe 2008: 620; Balzacq 2011: 62). 
Roe thus argues that both moral and formal support are needed for a successful 
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securitisation or otherwise the issue remains largely within the frames of public political 
debate. However, he agrees with Salter’s idea of successful and unsuccessful 
securitisation being a threshold rather than a clearly delineated binary. Roe (2008: 616) 
suggests that the audience [in both moral and formal domains] may agree that a certain 
issue must be treated as a threat or a security risk but disagree with the use extraordinary 
measures proposed. Thus the securitisation of an issue is neither successful nor 
unsuccessful.  
For the purpose of analysing audience perceptions towards ECE immigration in the 
United Kingdom and their subsequent reception of the rhetoric of the British political 
elite, the most resourceful approach has been proposed by John Kingdon (1984). In his 
book Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (1984) the author differentiates between 
three ’streams’, namely the problem, policy and politics streams. While originally 
formulated to address changes in public policy, it has also been widely applied in 
securitisation literature. The decision behind opting for Kingdon’s model can be found 
in the fact that it allows to make a “useful analytical distinction between different 
audiences” tying each to a different stream, such as other policymakers and the political 
elite (problem), specialists, who are involved in forming migration legislation and 
research (policy) and the wider public, “which comprises elements such as public mood, 
pressure groups campaigns, election results” (Leonard and Kaunert 2011: 67; 74); while 
incorporating references to media, social context and significant events that might have 
an important effect on the overall outcome. Salter’s approach has been dismissed due to 
its inclusion of the scientific setting, which in this study remains irrelevant and Roe’s 
framework is regarded less productive due to its neglect of several important concepts 
such as the sociocultural context and the fluctuation in election results.  
In Kingdon’s problem stream, “an actor aims to construct a policy problem by using 
indicators [including the media and statistics] and external events”, which signal the rise 
of a problem and can be subsequently used as an evidence and incentive in the 
construction of that problem  (Leonard and Kaunert 2011: 65). The aim is to persuade 
the other members of the party, other political parties in the country, the governing 
political elite and policy-makers (Kingdon 1984).  The policy stream is predominantly 
occupied, as the name infers, with policy formation and thus the audience in this 
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domain is composed of “specialists [i.e. think tanks, academics, bureaucracy] and 
technocrats“ who tend to be “convinced by arguments based upon knowledge, 
rationality and efficiency” (Leonard and Kaunert 2011: 67). In this stream the main 
institutions under observation include Institute of Race Relations; Centre on Migration, 
Policy and Society (COMPAS); Migration Watch UK; Migration Advisory Committee; 
The Migration Observatory, etc. This stream is the least biased, since it is based on 
statistical analysis and research, which might be used in other two streams selectively 
for one’s own political gain. The politics stream is associated most with common people 
and refers to the general public mood and election results as well as bargaining between 
parties and building winning coalitions to shift the public opinion (Kingdon 1984). 
Thus, Kingdon’s model follows logical sequence- in the problem stream “a political 
problem is identified”, in the policy stream “policy alternatives are discussed” and in the 
politics stream the issue is placed “on a public agenda” (Zakopalová 2012: 9).  
An important feature behind the audience acceptance, applicable in all three approaches, 
is constructing “political trust, loyalty and identity through the distribution of fear and 
an intensification of alienation” (Huysmans 2006: 47). This pertains to the idea that the 
audience in all settings are more supporting to the measures proposed to tackle the 
threats and insecurities when there is an overall unified sense of discomfort. Thus it is 
easier to focus on the dangerous outsiders and reflect it in political discourse through 
the distinction between “us” and “them” rather than to accumulate one’s resources for 
the restructuring of internal dynamics (Huysmans 2006). As Huysmans argues: “It is the 
rendition of dangerous life that makes the judgement of the good life possible” 
(Huysmans 2006: 47). 
 
2.3. Facilitating Conditions 
 
While the acceptance of the discursive construction of a perceived threat by different 
audiences in different settings is essential for a successful completion of securitisation, 
there are several conditions that must be present to ease this process. There are called 
“felicity” or “facilitating conditions” of a speech act theory- “conditions required for the 
successful accomplishment of a speech act” (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010: 77). 
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Without these conducive elements, the process often remains within the frames of 
politicisation.  
Balzacq mentions that the audience is often not fully informed of the scope or “on the 
temporal proximity and spatial substance” of threats and therefore is entirely reliant on 
discourses they are presented with (Balzacq 2011: 34). With immigration, however, 
people themselves perceive the changes to their everyday lives, or gradually 
transforming demographics in their local areas, which might provide a necessary push 
to move the issue out of the politicisation framework into the securitisation one. 
Michael Williams (2003: 56) has similarly argued that images and visual 
representations construct the way “immigration is experienced by relevant publics”. He 
predominantly focuses on the images of illegal immigrants and asylum-seekers on 
television and news media, but it can be argued that images of Polish migrants queuing 
in front of job centres and “Romanian beggars” swamping the entrances of parks and 
malls can have a similar effect.  
Buzan et al. (1998: 33)  argue that the conditions for a successful securitisation are 
firstly, “the internal grammatical form of the act”. The grammar of the security 
discourse must be thought through so that the language best resonates with the 
audience. Therefore the speaker must “tune his/her language to the audience's 
experience” and expectations (Balzacq 2011: 9). This refers back to the issue of 
different settings, where, for example, the general British public and immigration 
analysts must be addressed differently to achieve the prospective effect.  Secondly, “the 
social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitising actor- that is, 
the relationship between the speaker and the audience and thereby the likelihood of the 
audience accepting the claims made in a securitising attempt” (Buzan et al. 1998: 33). 
Therefore it can be concluded that “the more capabilities a securitising actor has the 
more likely this actor will succeed in attempted securitization” (Coskun 2012: 40). 
Thirdly, “features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitisation” 
and whether the proclaimed threat can be “linked to previously securitised issues” 
(Buzan et al. 1998: 33; Zakopalová 2012: 5). 
These three points derive from J. L. Austin’s criteria for a successful speech act, where 
he distinguishes between (1) “the internal, linguistic-grammatical”, and (2) “the 
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external, contextual and social” conditions (Austin 1975: 34 as cited in Buzan et al. 
1998: 32). Thus securitisation in heavily contingent upon the context where the speech 
acts are delivered in and the linguistic manufacture it comprises.  
 
2.4. Limitations 
 
To comprehend the full potential of securitisation theory, in addition to facilitating 
conditions, possible limitations and pitfalls should be addressed. The problematic 
concepts of the “audience” and “extraordinary measures” were already discussed- the 
former due to its considerable underdevelopment, the latter due to its contradictory 
elements (extraordinary measures are not always necessary) in the original theory. The 
spectrum ranging from nonpoliticised to securitised and the problematic feature of rigid 
demarcation of the spheres on this spectrum was also discussed. An issue can always be 
accepted as an existential threat to a referent object in one setting (e.g. the government) 
but not in another (e.g. the public opinion) (like it was the case with the invasion of Iraq 
in Great Britain). In this case we can argue neither for nor against a successful and 
completed process of securitisation. In addition, an audience might agree “to the 
'securityness' of a given issue”, but at the same time “disagree over the 
'extraordinaryness' of the measures proposed” (Roe 2008: 616). In this case we similarly 
do not have a case of failed securitisation, since the audience accepted something as a 
security threat; or a case of a successful securitisation, “as the means necessary to deal 
with the issue are not also intersubjectively established” (Roe 2008: 616). 
Furthermore, Buzan et al. (1998: 23) draw attention to the complicated nature of the 
“existential threat”- “It is extremely difficult to establish hard boundaries that 
differentiate existential from lesser threats”.  It must be noted that identities change over 
time, and thus, something that could have been regarded as an existential threat before, 
might have become part of the natural evolution of the state at a later stage (Buzan et al. 
1998). This idea is closely linked to the concept of “normal politics”, which is also 
dynamic rather than static and therefore there is no clear definition to the concept, 
similarly to that of “extraordinary measures” (Buzan 2009; Buzan 1993). The inherent 
dynamics of these concepts brings us to the issue of time framing and particularly to the 
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question of “How long does one have to wait for securitisation to take place?”. 
Likewise, Vuori (2011: 191) makes an interesting remark by asking whether 
securitisation is “like a wedding (once it is done you do not have to worry about it) or is 
it like a marriage that needs [constant] maintenance”- an idea that is left upon the 
individual analyst’s discretion.  
Securitisation also allows for the “indefinite widening of the security agenda” since it 
could be applied to pretty much everything (Roe 2008: 617). This, however, might 
“destroy the internal coherence of the security field”- a critique most vocally elaborated 
by Stephen Walt (Roe 2008: 617; Walt 1991). Furthermore, Buzan et al. (1998: 39) 
advise that “security analysis is interested mainly in successful instances of 
securitisation”, because “they constitute the currently valid specific meaning of 
security”. This statement, however, could be considered as an important weakness of 
the original theory. As mentioned earlier, unsuccessful securitisation still indicates some 
kind of social instability or gives an idea about the direction of the future security 
discourse. In addition, Balzacq (2011: 34) draws attention to “selection bias” if one only 
focuses on completed securitisation. He maintains that “the selection of cases on the 
basis of outcomes can understate or overstate the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables” (Balzacq 2011: 34). Focusing on outcomes often distorts the 
research process and moulds it into an expected and comfortable research path. Thus the 
study at hand is mainly interested in securitising moves and then looks at whether they 
have been accepted by the audience. It first focuses on the process and then on the 
outcome, rather than the other way round, as suggested by the original framework.  
The weaknesses should also be addressed with regard to the adopted methodology. 
Discourse analysis provides a necessary framework to understand “how securitisation 
operates” and what kind of linguistic features are applied for the maximum result; but at 
the same time discourse analysis is “weak in uncovering why certain securitising moves 
succeed and when” (Balzacq 2011: 47). In addition, it must be highlighted that 
discourse analysis only functions “at the behest of the individual researcher” (Daddow 
2010: 387). Therefore it is entirely up to the researcher to decide what is important and 
what is unimportant in the linguistic manufacture of texts. Thus the results are highly 
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dependent on the individual researcher’s own perceptions and viewpoints, which might 
undermine the validity and reliability of the findings.  
With regard to this particular study, one must highlight the unequal power positions and 
thus different platforms and means of persuasion of the two British political parties 
under scrutiny. Due to the two-party and “first-past-the-post” electoral system in Great 
Britain, UKIP does not and probably will never have the same measures to influence 
public policy and legislation as the mainstream parties. UKIP has never had an MP 
elected to the House of Commons
19
, which also prevents the investigation of an open 
dialogue (i.e. a parliamentary debate) between the parties. UKIP does, however, exert 
considerable influence on all three main political parties in the country with regard to 
their immigration rhetoric (Birrell 2013). UKIP’s recent success in local elections 
should also not be dismissed since it indicates interesting political developments in 
contemporary Britain and fuels anticipation with regard to the upcoming general 
elections in 2015.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 Bob Spink became UKIP’s first Member of Parliament in 2008 after having been first elected there as a 
member of the Conservative Party, but later decided to changed his allegiance (BBC 2008). 
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3. Methodology  
3.1. Discourse Analysis 
 
To fully comprehend the dynamics behind the construction aspects of language and 
textual productions, discourse analysis
20
 is a adopted as the method of the study. For  
more in-depth and resourceful results, a specific form of discourse analysis, namely 
critical discourse analysis is applied. To fully understand the idea behind these methods, 
one should first elaborate what is meant under “discourse”. Discourse in the most 
conventional sense stands for text. Hardy et al. (2004: 20 as cited in Balzacq 2011: 39) 
maintain that discourses are “bodies of text...that bring...ideas, objects and practices into 
the world”. Yet, a plethora of authors21 do not agree with this rather simplistic 
interpretation and emphasise that discourses manifest themselves in both linguistic and 
non-linguistic practices. Already J. L. Austin, whose speech acts theory (1962) is the 
original idea behind CS securitisation framework, saw discourse more than a textual 
production. For him “discourse can be in written, visual or oral form, verbal or 
nonverbal” (Wodak 2008: 5).  Van Djik elaborates further and argues that discourse 
should be seen in a much broader manifestation, as a “communicative event”, including 
in addition to written text “conversational interaction... as well as associated gestures, 
facework, typographical layout, images and any other semiotic or multimedia 
dimension of signification” (van Djik 2001: 98). Balzacq (2011: 39) adds to this idea by 
highlighting that text does not just stand for written and spoken words; it comprises a 
“variety of signs, including written and spoken utterances, symbols, pictures, music”. 
For Ted Hopf discourse is also about more than words or written texts- “it is also about 
the daily conduct in which each of us engages to make our way in the social world” 
(Hopf 2004: 32). Perhaps the best interpretation of “discourse” is provided by Laffey 
and Weldes (2004). They argue that discourse is not equivalent to language and 
linguistic attributes should not even be used in the definition of the concept. Instead 
they define discourse as “structure and practices” that are used to construct meaning in 
the world (Laffey and Weldes 2004: 28). This perception stems from the idea that 
                                                          
20
 Ruth Wodak clarifies that „the term discourse analysis stems etymologically from the Greek verb 
analuein ’to deconstruct’ and the Latin verb discurrere ’to run back and forth’“ (Wodak 2008: 4) 
21
 See, for example, Torfing (2005); van Djik (2001); Balzacq (2005); Balzacq (2011), Hopf (2004), 
Jackson (2007) 
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discourse is not simply collection of words, but a “constitutive set of structures and 
practices, that do not merely reflect thoughts or realities, but rather structure and 
constitute them” (Herrera and Braumoeller 2004: 16). Therefore one could argue that 
there is no one single definition of discourse that everyone can agree on, but the 
meaning of discourse rather depends on a particular research, theoretical approach, 
context and analytical framework. Due to the limited number of pages of the research 
paper at hand, the main focus of the analysis will be on verbal and textual aspects of 
discourse.  
Opting for discourse analysis with regard to this study lies in the idea that it embodies a 
helpful tool in mapping the emergence, (re)production and evolution of patterns of 
representations which constitute ECE immigration to Britain as a threat image (Balzacq 
2011). One must also keep in mind the fact that securitisation theory is a speech act 
theory, which assumes that discourses do not simply report on reality as it is, but rather 
do things (Wæver 1995; Wæver et al. 1993; Buzan et al. 1998). It is interested in the 
“power of language in transforming situations” (Trombetta 2011: 137). 
Discourse theory is also problem driven, which seeks to interpret and analyse specific 
societal puzzles- or in other words describe the relationship between textual and social 
processes (Torfing 2005; Jackson 2007). These societal puzzles, however, might be the 
result of a skilled manipulation of discourse as Daddow maintains “discourses can be 
powerful legitimating and motivating devices” even when the validity of statements is 
only presented as such  (Daddow 2010: 385). Foucault (1985 as cited in Torfing 2005: 
7), for example, is not even concerned with the truth or the meaning of actual 
statements, but rather with “their discursive conditions of possibility”. Similarly, Oliver 
Daddow focuses on the “artificial closures” of politicians that “make their discourses 
appear to be the 'truth' about how the world works” and on language and phraseology 
more broadly to identify the way policymakers present their proposals as hegemonic to 
those of others (Daddow 2010: 386). Therefore discourse analysis has an integral 
importance when one attempts to capture the design of threat images (Balzacq 2011). 
The truth of the actual statement is not relevant. In this way, the Copenhagen School 
“does not focus on the truth of a statement but the truth effect of it” (Trombetta 2011: 
137). What is important is the manipulation of discursive practices in a way that invokes 
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trust in the claims delivered by the securitising actor. Therefore language is 
performative and threats and insecurities are the product of one’s discursive articulation 
of the threat (Hansen 2006; Laffey and Weldes 2004; Trombetta 2011). 
In addition to the validity aspect of delivered statements, discourse analysis regards the 
contextual framework of discourse. Migration is one of the most loaded concepts “in a 
political spectacle”, which is being articulated not only through “using...a technocratic 
language of efficiency and effectiveness but a dramatic existential language of 
emergencies, fears, and crises” linked to historic and social settings (Huysmans 2006: 
82). So a resourceful discourse analysis must go deeper than mere examination of 
linguistic practices and take into consideration the context where discourse is produced 
and delivered (Balzacq 2011; Wodak 2008; Fairclough 1995). As Balzacq maintains, 
since “discourse does not occur nor operate in a vacuum” the aim of discourse analysis 
is to “establish the meaning of texts shaped by distinct contexts” (Balzacq 2011: 36, 
40). This is especially important since the same word uttered in different social settings, 
does not have the same effect and discourse analysis has the tools to explain these 
different meanings across different contexts (Hopf 2004).  
 
3.2. Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
The research paper adopts critical discourse analysis (CDA) as the core methodology of 
the analysis. The reasons behind opting for CDA and preferring it over its post-
stucturalist counterpart will be outlined in the following section.  
The simple idea behind critical discourse analysis is that it allows one to think critically 
about the way world works and how discursive practices are often being used to create 
images and perceptions to further one’s self-interest in various sociocultural and 
historical contexts.  
Laffey and Weldes (2004: 29) argue that discursive practices are always about the 
production and distribution of power, or in other words, discourses entail “the 
inextricably theoretical and practical struggle for power to preserve or transform the 
social world”. Van Dijk argues that CDA is, so to speak, discourse analysis “with an 
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attitude”- “that is, CDA is biased and proud of it” (van Dijk 2001: 96). That means that 
critical discourse analysis is not politically neutral; as a critical approach it is politically 
committed to social change and uncovering the correlation between “textual properties 
and power relations” (Horváth 2011: 47). The critical orientation in discourse analysis, 
therefore, refers to the “explicit ways of power abuse in creating distorted perceptions 
and sometimes outright societal inequality” (van Djik 1993: 96). Thus it is the best way 
to analyse the discursive practices which might contribute and (re)produce unequal 
power relations between political parties in Great Britain. Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) 
add that CDA is usually opted for when the focus of analysis concerns “social classes, 
women and men,.. minorities and the majority” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 63). 
Therefore the critical strand of discourse analysis is “fundamentally concerned with 
analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, 
discrimination, power and control as manifested in language” or in other words the 
hidden and unhidden; implicit and explicit wiring behind the textual productions to 
garner support for proposed political programmes and policies  (Wodak 2001: 2; 
Daddow 2010: 385).  
Another reason for opting CDA stems from the relationship it assumes between 
discursive practices and social structures. Its argues for a dialectical relationship 
between the two (Figure 5)- “Discourse is a form of social practice which both 
constitutes the social world and is constituted by other social practices” (Jørgensen and 
Phillips 2002: 62; Fairclough 1992; Fairclough 1995). Poststructuralist discourse 
analysis, in comparison, sees discourse only as constitutive and ignores the dialectical 
relationship (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002).   
 
 
Figure 5 The role of discourse in the constitution of the world 
Source: adapted from Jørgensen, M. and Phillips, L. (2002) Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, p. 
20 
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Fairclough’s idea is that when text is socially constructed, then the interpretation of this 
text might give us an idea about the cultural, social and psychological framework of this 
text; yet this framework places some limits on or creates incentives for the text itself 
(Fairclough 1992). This is particularly important as the discursive construction of ECE 
immigration as a threat is contextually bounded by the fact that Great Britain is a 
member of the EU which might place some restrictions on the structure and substance 
of linguistic practices. Furthermore, as Leonard (2013) argues that due to the 
“membership in the European Union, Europe’s nations do not have the luxury of 
disentangling themselves from one another”. Therefore the advantage of CDA is that it 
recognises both directions, and in particular it “[explores] the tension between these two 
sides of language use, the socially shaped and socially constitutive” (Horváth 2011: 46; 
Fairclough 1995: 131). Jørgensen and Phillips conclude that in CDA “language-as-
discourse is both a form of action through which people can change the world and a 
form of action which is socially and historically situated and in a dialectical relationship 
with other aspects of the social” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 62). 
 
3.3. Three-Dimensional Framework  
 
Discourse analysis draws attention to two main features of text analysis: intratextuality 
and intertextuality. The former emphasises the internal coherence of text, the 
performative dimension i.e. what is the purpose of the text and what representations are 
created to achieve this, whereas the latter implies relationships among different 
linguistic practices (Balzacq 2011: 43). Intratextuality will be further analysed with the 
help of Fairclough’s model for discourse analysis in the second half of this section. Let 
us first elaborate further on the latter concept- intertextuality. Texts generally make 
references to previously written texts, whether just referring to them or using direct 
quotations to indicate the conjunction. Even using formerly used or coined words or 
phrases by others might refer to intertextuality (Hansen 2006). The meaning of and an 
idea behind a textual production is therefore “never fully given by the text itself but is 
always a product of other readings and interpretations” (Hansen 2006: 55). Thus, 
intertextuality has generative power. Politically salient topics generate further texts and 
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discourses, which refer back to the original sources. Therefore from a research 
perspective it would be futile to focus just on one text, but instead on “various genres of 
texts,  at different points in time, in distinct social contexts” (Neumann 2008: 71 as cited 
in Balzacq 2011: 43). Balzacq maintains that if an analyst realises the potential of 
interplay between bodies and substance of texts, it will become clear that “patterns of 
representations emanate out of the interrelations between various texts” (Balzacq 2011: 
43). Hardy et al. agree by maintaining that social reality arises out of “interrelated 
bodies of texts...that bring new ideas, objects and practices into the world” (Hardy et al. 
2004: 20). It must be noted, however, that in addition to generative power of creating 
new ideas, intertextuality also has the power to revise and revitalise the past at certain 
points in time, whenever it might be useful for policymakers to draw upon past events. 
Within the context of the research paper at hand intertextuality is important as British 
politicians, as any other, “articulate their policies through references to other texts 
and...address other discourses within the public debate while seeking to establish their 
own discourse as hegemonic” compared to the opposition (Hansen 2006: 215). 
Discourse seems to have more legitimacy when policymakers and authoritative figures 
can bolster their claims and propositions through referencing previously written texts. 
The concepts of intratextuality and intertextuality will receive heightened attention and 
practical application in the emprical part of the analysis. However, to give the analysis a 
more structured bend Norman Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework for the 
analysis of discourse has been opted for, where intratextuality and intertextuality will be 
analysed in the second dimension of the method (Fairclough 1992; Fairclough 1995). 
Yet, Fairclough adds two more dimensions, which should not be dismissed if one 
wishes to execute a resourceful and meaningful analysis.  
With regard to the particular study Fairclough’s three-dimensional model provides the 
best analytical framework for critical discourse analysis. Fairclough argues that “every 
instance of language use is a communicative event consisting of three dimensions” 
(Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 68). The textual, discursive and social dimensions are all 
interlinked and in a mutual relationship- an idea that other types of discourse analyses 
easily dismiss. The model is based on the premise that texts cannot be understood or 
analysed in isolation. Fairclough himself has argued that the three dimensional division 
of “the framework encapsulates what I think is an important principle for critical 
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discourse analysis; that analysis of texts should not be artificially isolated from analysis 
of institutional and discoursal practices within which texts are embedded” (Fairclough 
1995: 9). The analysis should therefore focus on: (a) the linguistic features of the text 
(b) the production, consumption and distribution of the text (c) the wider societal 
context where the text has been produced in (and the sociocultural practice to which the 
communicative event belongs to) (Figure 6) (Fairclough 1992; Fairclough 1995; 
Jørgensen and Phillips 2002).  From the perspective of the securitisation/politicisation 
dichotomy, and the foundations for the former’s successful completion, we are most 
interested in the second dimension of the model, which addresses the consumption of 
the text. Text analysis in isolation from other texts and sociocultual context was already 
criticised. Fairclough’s model further highlights the importance of the audience 
reception, which should similarly not be overlooked. The second dimension’s 
consideration  of “the diverse ways in which... texts may be interpreted and responded 
to” coincides with the Copenhagen School securitisation theory, which assumes the 
audience an integral role in the process of constructing an issue as existentially 
threatening (Fairclough 1995: 9). 
 
Figure 6 Fairclough’s three-dimensional model for critical discourse 
Source: Jørgensen, M. and Phillips, L. J. (2002) Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, p. 68 
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In the following the three different dimensions will be analytically separated and 
elaborated upon, which will prepare us for a more systematic understanding of the 
empirical part of the study.  
 
3.3.1. The Core Dimension- Text 
 
Fairclough (1992: 75) organises text analysis under four main headings: “vocabulary, 
grammar, cohesion and text structure”. He maintains that this can be thought as 
ascending in scale, starting with the individual words, then moving to wider formations 
like clauses and sentences, then how these are linked together and finally the structure 
deals with “large-scale organisational properties of the text”. Particularly imperative 
with regard to the study at hand is the notion of ethos (“how identities are constructed 
through language”)  and the use of metaphors (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 83). These 
give an idea how texts and wording construct “truth effect” as well as “particular 
versions of reality, social identities and social relations” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 
83). Metaphors, for example, help to dramatise the socio-economic problematic of the 
issue addressed and translate the “experiences of economic and social uncertainty into 
opposition to and fear of immigrants” (Huysmans 2000: 769). Metaphors might create 
false perceptions and play an important role in structuring “the way we think and the 
way we act, and our systems of knowledge and belief” (Fairclough 1992: 194). 
Regarding the securitisation of immigration, one can immediately notice the wording of 
media headlines and political discourse, which often integrate words such as 'flood', 
'flock', 'wave' and 'invasion' of immigrants.  The word 'flood', for example, is 
immediately associated with a natural disaster usually bringing along life-changing 
consequences and 'invasion', which is a military term, is generally linked to violence 
and submission and play an integral part in creating much powerful images in people’s 
minds than the situation might actually prove to be in the reality (Huysmans 2006). 
For Fairclough, text analysis alone is not sufficient for discourse analysis, as it does not 
address the wider processes of discursive development and the links between texts and 
sociocultural structures. Therefore he has added two more dimensions of analysis, the 
second of which the research paper will now turn to. 
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3.3.2. The Middle Dimension- Discourse Practice 
This dimension has a crucial mediating role in the model; it mediates “the relationship 
between texts on one hand and (nontextual parts of) society and culture on the other” 
(Fairclough 1995: 10). 
Fairclough distinguishes three main focus points in this dimension: (a) the “force” of 
utterances and what type of speech acts they constitute (e.g. promises, requests, threats) 
to achieve an intended result; (b) the “coherence” of text, which is in close conjunction 
with the notion of previously discussed intratextuality; (c) the “intertextuality” of texts 
(Fairclough 1992). Intertextuality is concerned with “the question of which relevant 
'external' texts and voices are included in a text, and which are (significantly) excluded” 
(Fairclough 2003: 61). This is an important consideration to bear in mind when 
analysing the consumption and interpretation of the text by audiences. The inclusion 
and referencing of previously written texts and conscious exclusion of other texts play a 
significant role in the overall perceptions it creates in the society. 
Therefore, overall, these three headings allow the analyst to elaborate on the aspects of 
production and consumption of the text. Analysis involves both the detailed explication 
of how discourse has been put together, which discursive practices are being drawn 
upon and in what combinations and how it has been interpreted and consumed by the 
audience (Fairclough 1995). 
 
3.3.3. The Outer Dimension- Social Practice 
 
The last and the broadest dimension, and thus perhaps the most abstract, is linked to the 
social context of the text and with notions of ideology, hegemony and power. 
Fairclough’s idea of power derives from Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. In a Gramscian 
view, politics is seen as a struggle for hegemony, which is maintained and articulated 
through ideology. Following this idea, Fairclough argues that power depends upon 
“achieving consent or at least acquiescence rather than just having the resources to use 
force, and the importance of ideology in sustaining relations of power” (Fairclough 
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2003: 45). This is not only about having the power over people in its traditional sense, 
but actually creating subtle levels of persuasion for achieving consent among the 
audience and maintaining that through constant rearticulation of ideology. This idea 
coincides with the theory of securitisation, which requires audience consent in defining 
security matters.  
Therefore power should not be understood as exclusively oppressive and only in the 
context of coercion but as productive; “power constitutes discourse, knowledge, bodies 
and subjectivities” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 13). Fairclough borrows some of his 
assumptions from Foucault to whom he devotes significant attention in his earlier work 
(e.g. Fairclough 1992). Within this context it is important to highlight Foucault’s 
quotation: “It [power] needs to be considered as a productive network which runs 
through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is 
repression” (Foucault 1980: 119 as cited in Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 13). However 
in addition to Foucault’s view of power as productive rather than a pure coercion, 
critical discourse analysis highlights the notion of dominance and the “subjugation of 
one social group to another” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 63).  Therefore critical 
discourse analysis stands out for its emphasis on power relations and how discursive 
practices are constructed in furthering the interests of particular social groups. To 
conclude, it must be pronounced that “language is not powerful on its own; it gains 
power by the use powerful people make of it” (Wodak 2011: 35). This coincides with 
one of the facilitating conditions for a successful securitisation, which emphasises the 
position of authority of the securitising actor. 
Critical discourse analysis and more specifically Norman Fairclough’s three-
dimensional model has been opted for due to its capability to grasp textual (and non-
textual) activities of securitisation; the underlying and hidden assumptions of discursive 
practices as well as linguistic characteristics of textual productions; their effect on the 
audience and the general role of the sociocultural setting the discourse has been 
produced and consumed in. This model follows the assumption of the CS that for a 
successful securitisation two rules- the internal or linguistic-grammatical and the 
external, contextual and social- must be fulfilled (Balzacq 2005; Buzan et al. 1998).  
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4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Analytical Framework 
 
The discourse analytic technique employed in the research proceeded in two stages. The 
first stage engaged in the selection of texts pertaining to discourse on Central and East 
European immigration to the UK; the threat image they are supposed to embody; East 
and Western Europe ideological divide deriving from historical incongruity; and texts 
reflecting British “exceptionalism”. It included primary and secondary sources- the 
former comprised of political speeches and statements, opinion polls and a variety of 
UK and EU legislation documents; the latter included academic works and publications.  
Primary units of analysis were public speeches, statements and announcements by 
authoritative figures (Prime Minister, Home Secretary, MPs, party leaders, the Cabinet 
Secretaries) or authorised speakers of the immigration discourse (immigration think 
tank members, researchers) as well as media publications, which is often used as a 
platform for reaching wider audiences and garnering more layered public support. Most 
of the speeches were found from the government website archives (www.gov.uk) under 
speeches and transcripts; from the British political speech archive 
(www.britishpoliticalspeech.org); or from the party websites (www.ukip.org and 
www.conservatives.com). UKIP member speeches and announcements were slightly 
more difficult to reach due to the lack of available transcripts. UKIP website, however, 
has a considerable amount of videos of the speeches delivered and references to other 
sites where video transcripts can be found.  
The timeline for the analysis was from 2004 until the present [2013] for both parties. 
All speeches were looked up with the keyword “(im)migration”; occasionally the “EU 
enlargement”; “Romania” and “Bulgaria”; “East and Central Europe” were applied. 
Most of the speeches were delivered at party conferences or at university campuses, 
which is important from two aspects. Firstly, for a more productive analysis, one needs 
to bear in mind the context- especially the distal and proximate variations proposed by 
Thierry Balzacq (2011). Secondly, the context aspect of the speeches coincides with 
Kingdon’s model (if delivered at a party conference, the main focus is to receive 
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audience acceptance in the problem stream) as well as Fairclough’s social practice 
dimension (the interplay of power, ideology and context). 
Similarly to Richard Jackson’s thought-provoking analysis of “Islamic terrorism” in 
political and academic discourse, this study relied on “the labels, assumptions, 
narratives, predicates, metaphors, inferences and arguments” which politicians, 
authoritative figures and the media deployed as well as “the kinds of existing cultural-
political narratives and pre-existing texts they drew upon” (Jackson 2007: 395). The 
second stage of the study applied Norman Fairclough’s previously described three-
dimensional framework for analysing discourse, which gives specific attention to 
textual productions, discursive practice and the social dimension where the text is 
produced and consumed. Thus it linked text and context by adding contextual 
framework to the discursive productions of relevant texts to establish a coherent image 
of the politicising and securitising practices and attempts of the two political parties 
under observation.  
Special attention was given to reception by the audience, following Kingdon’s “three 
streams model”, which separates the problem, policy and politics streams. The 
framework was linked to the Fairclough’s CDA model on as many cases as possible for 
a more coherent approach; especially to Fairclough’s second dimension, which 
addresses the consumption of discursive practices. Kingdon’s three streams were 
addressed through extensive reading of policy documents, media publications and 
research papers conducted by think tanks and government agencies; public debates and 
an investigation of various opinion polls to get an overall idea of the general tendencies 
towards immigration among the wider British public.  
 
4.2. UKIP versus the Conservative Party in British Politics 
 
The Conservative Party is one of the two largest political parties in Great Britain and 
has currently formed a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats, headed by 
Prime Minister David Cameron. The previously marginal right-wing populist UKIP, on the 
other hand, has become the fastest growing political party in the country (Figure 7) and 
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is making headlines due to its anti-EU and anti-immigration rhetoric not just in Britain 
but throughout Europe, thus creating apprehension among the bigger parties and 
eroding their support base. UKIP “burst onto center stage” in May 2013 when it 
captured “almost a quarter of the votes in local elections around the country, threatening 
to upset the stable two-party system that has existed for the last century” (Leonard 
2013). This is considered to be “the biggest surge by a fourth party in England since the 
second World War”, indicating turbulent changes and developments in the 
contemporary British political terrain  (Watt 2013a). UKIP is no longer simply seen as a 
protest party, which only garners votes due to prevalent discontent and disappointment 
with the largest two political parties in the UK. Over the years UKIP’s image as a 
single-issue party has changed due to its more widespread focus on issues such as the 
economy, taxes, education, climate, etc. in addition to its main debating platforms of 
immigration and the EU.  
 
Figure 7  
Source: The Guardian, 9 March 2013 URL: http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/mar/09/ukip-
opinium-observer-opinion-poll 
 
This has resulted in a gradual change of the rhetoric of the Conservative Party to regain 
ground from UKIP ahead of the next general election in 2015. It must be noted that 
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UKIP does not have a single member in the British House of Commons and therefore 
does not have the same means and resources for affecting British policymaking. At the 
same time, their constantly increasing support base and recent best ever parliamentary 
performance at the Eastleigh byelection on 28 February 2013, receiving more votes than 
the Conservative Party, is a clear indication of the increasing sentiment among the 
British public that immigration and the EU’s legislation on the matter is a growing 
concern within the country.  
 
4.3. The Conservative Party Immigration Rhetoric- Recent Developments 
 
The Conservative Party’s discourse was analysed over a time period of 9 years, from 
2004 until the present [May 2013]. It is natural that different politicians have a 
“distinctive repertoire of ways of speaking” (Fairclough 2000: 96). There are some 
underlying dynamics that emerge throughout the Conservative discourse and overall 
one can note a gradual shift towards a more powerful use of language and choice of 
words. The first thing that catches the eye, especially regarding the Prime Minister’s 
speeches, is that he always starts with the beneficial aspects of immigration, linking it 
closely to British exceptional character as a host nation. This kind of tactic is excepted 
from a mainstream party, whose discursive construction is based on “political 
correctness” and rhetorical balance. Boswell highlights another important notion: “If 
migration is depicted [only] as a security risk, this will make it more difficult for a state 
to justify economically beneficial labour migration” which is important from the 
coherence aspect of discourse (Boswell 2007: 2). From an another end of the spectrum, 
critics maintain that Cameron “has been known to attack immigration and celebrate 
immigrants in the same speech” and this kind of fluctuation in the linguistic 
manufacture does not evoke trust among the public or an idea that the issue is being 
tackled (Rawnsley 2013).  
One can also note constant references to British “exceptionalism” as a powerful island 
nation with rich history and altruistic politics, such as: “This is our island story- open, 
diverse and welcoming”; “The generosity” of our nation (Cameron 2013c); “We have 
the finest police officers in the world” (May 2012a); Britain is “the best country in the 
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world” with “the finest Head of State on earth”, “There is absolutely nothing we cannot 
do” (Cameron 2012); “To be British is to be generous; whenever there’s a disaster on 
the other side of the world, British people dig deep into their pockets and give their 
money” (Cameron 2009); “We’re an island. We’re the fourth richest nation in the 
world” (Howard 2005b); “Britain is the best country in the world” (Howard 2004). 
Almost every immigration speech includes a section on British greatness, which can be 
considered a resourceful rhetorical tactic to evoke sentiments of national pride among 
the British public and create a sense of insecurity and concern about the erosion of great 
British values. 
 
The Conservative Party texts were also analysed within the framework of Fairclough’s 
three-dimensional model, which firstly looks at the vocabulary, grammar and the use of 
metaphors or other linguistic attributes; secondly focuses on the “force” of utterances 
i.e. promises and confirmations- which were very much prevalent in all Conservative 
Party speeches- and the consumption aspects of the discourse as well as intertextuality 
or references to previously written texts; and finally the social context, wherein the 
discourse was delivered.  
As already mentioned, due to the change in rhetoric over time, the linguistic 
manufacture of speeches has provided more analytical substance closer to the present 
day. Cameron’s most recent speech delivered at University Campus Suffolk in Ipswich 
included the metaphor “we should be rolling up that red carpet” for immigrants 
(Cameron 2013c); while the same metaphor was being used just a month before in 
India, mentioning that Britain will “have the red carpet rolled out” for Indian students 
(Cameron 2013b), referring to intertextuality and indicating David Cameron’s welcome 
to “hardworking Indians” in contrast to “the new EU entrants” (Lentin 2013). This is a 
significant observation in all three dimensions of Fairclough’s model- from the textual 
aspect and opting for the same metaphor; from the discursive practice viewpoint 
regarding the audience of both speeches and the “force” of utterance indicating clear 
sympathy for one group over another; and from the social practice dimension, which 
addresses the context and power play. Cameron does not seem to worry about the 
talented immigration of foreign nationals to Britain, but is rather concerned about the 
 49 
 
unskilled labour force from the ECE countries. With regard to the former, Cameron is 
suggesting “to take down the barriers” and uses the word “partner” or “partnering” four 
times; the word “partnership” five times and the word “relationship” a staggering twelve 
times in a short 1600-word speech (Cameron 2013b). Thus, ECE migrants are 
increasingly becoming the victims of what has become known as “xeno-racism”22- only 
those are tolerated, who benefit the country; those, who simply come in search for a 
better life, are not. As Fekete maintains: “in this brave new post-Cold War world, the 
enemy is not so much ideology as poverty” (Fekete 2001). 
Metaphors are used by both the Conservative Party members as well as the UKIP 
candidates. Their presentation, however, and the selection of words indicates much 
more powerful rhetoric from the UKIP side e.g. “our communities just can’t cope with 
the demands of ever greater numbers flooding in” from the EU (Cameron 2011c); or 
“On 1 January 2014 the floodgates will open for Bulgarian and Romanian citizens [to 
come to Britain]...the only way is a moratorium on immigration”  (UKIP candidate 
Diane James as cited by the press association in the Guardian 2013a) and  opening “our 
doors to massive oversupply in the unskilled labour market... is an outrage” (Farage 
2013b).  
The context of Cameron’s latest speech is clearly evident. While Cameron’s earlier 
speeches have not made references to specific countries, in his speech in Ipswich on 25 
March 2013 he explicitly singles out and even stigmatises Bulgarian and Romanian 
migrants (e.g. they should not be “drawn by the attractiveness of our benefits system”). 
This is an important rhetorical statement from the perspective of power deriving from 
Fairclough’s social practice dimension, which looks at the subjugation of one social 
group, usually the minority or newcomers, to another. It can be argued that to create a 
sense of urgency and tension with regard to the latest newcomers of the EU, Cameron 
discursively links these migrants to welfare dependency and a strain on the labour 
                                                          
22 Xeno-racism indicates a phenomenon which “holds impoverished strangers, including whites, in its 
sight” and can be associated especially with Romanian and Bulgarain immigrants in the UK. Xeno-racism 
does not concentrate explicitly on racial, ethnic or religious values, but indicates an overall dislike of or 
discomfort with “the other”; but the way it “denigrates and reifies people” is an intrinsic quality of 
racism- “it is a xenophobia that bears all the marks of the old racism” (Fekete 2001). 
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market. He mentions that “we can’t stop these full transitional controls coming to an 
end, but what we can do is make sure that those who come here from the EU... do so for 
the right reasons” (Cameron 2013c). His choice of language firstly indicates that the 
current British government would extend transitional measures if it would coincide with 
the EU legislation and secondly, refers already in advance to the possibility that A2 
migrants might become a strain on the British welfare state.  He also mentions that there 
are “450,000 British 18 to 24 year olds on Jobseeker’s Allowance...and that had 
happened at the same time as the largest wave of migration in our country’s history” 
linking youth unemployment in the country to ECE migration and EU enlargement. He 
also used the soft/tough dichotomy contrasting the Conservative government to the 
previous Labour one and mentioned that Britain needs to end the “something for 
nothing”-culture (Cameron 2013c). The cohesion and structure of the paragraph 
enforces the reader subconsciously associate the Tories with a tough stance on 
immigration, whereas the previous government was weak and soft on the matter (e.g. 
“We need to break out of the old government silos”) (Cameron 2013c). Furthermore, 
the inclusion of numerical values, as previously mentioned, has a rhetorical effect which 
gives substance to claims. 
Cameron carried on that “by the end of this year...we are going to strengthen the test 
that determines which migrants can access benefits” (Cameron 2013c). This is an 
especially interesting propostion since the EU directive on the free movement of EU 
citizens (Directive 2004/38/EC) and EC Regulation EC 883/2004 maintain that with 
regard to social security benefits
23
 “EU citizens may not be treated differently from the 
nationals of a Member State” (once they are “habitually resident”24) (Kennedy 2011: 
17). Cameron also proposed a tougher “habitual residence test” before migrants receive 
income-related benefit, which has raised more concerns as “the existing test is already 
the subject of complaints from the European Commission, which is threatening legal 
                                                          
23
 Make difference between social security benefits (e.g. child benefit, invalidity benefit or contribution-
based Jobseeker’s Allowance; usually “granted to provide cover against the classical social security risks 
– sickness, maternity and paternity, accidents at work and occupational diseases, old-age and invalidity, 
unemployment”) and social assistance benefits (e.g. housing benefits and income support; these benefits 
are “typically means tested and given to people in need”) (European Commission in the UK 2013). 
24
 “Before EU citizens not active in the labour market become eligible for social security benefits they 
have to pass a strict “habitual residence test” proving that they have a genuine link with the UK”. This is a 
requirement implemented under  Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 September 2009 (European Commission in the UK 2013). 
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action against Britain, arguing that it breaches European agreements” (Castle and 
Cowell 2013). This means that the local people get priority in the social housing system, 
even though they might be less qualified. Cameron’s proposals can be seen as creating a 
platform for practical securitisation. However, it could be argued that securitisation, as 
introduced by Buzan and collaborators, remains rhetorical rather than practical in 
Cameron’s treatment. 
With regard to the EU and EEA nationals using the National Health Service (NHS), 
Cameron insists that “it is right that they or their government pay for it... British 
taxpayers should support British families” (Cameron 2013c). He continues that migrants 
who settle in Britain must prove “a decent command of English”: “We’re going to make 
that assessment a real and robust one” (Cameron 2013c).  Under new proposals “EEA 
nationals will lose Jobseeker’s Allowance and other benefits after six months unless 
they have a genuine chance of finding work and can show they have been trying to do 
so”- knowing the language is a necessary requirement for that (Grice 2013). 
 
This speech can be seen as a significant cornerstone in the future developments of 
Britain’s immigration policies. The Conservative Party is clearly affected by UKIP’s 
success in opinion polls and in recent local elections, where it garnered approximately 
25 per cent of the votes (The Guardian 2013b). Thus the context of the speech is 
important- lifting of labour restrictions for Bulgaria and Romania creates a sense of 
heightened tension among the British public; the start of campaigning for the next 
general election is at the doorstep and UKIP’s popularity is surging. Furthermore, the 
Conservative Party was still clearly “tormented by the Eastleigh defeat”, which gave 
them a push for proposing “a new set of policies...to win back the disenchanted” 
(Kesvani 2013). 
 
The speech was delivered by David Cameron just two months after his proposal for a 
EU referendum: “we will give the British people a referendum with a very simple in or 
out choice...to stay in the EU on...new terms, or come out altogether” (Cameron 2013a). 
This statement also indicates a very clear British mindset as a “strong-minded member 
of the family of European nations” whose requests for special conditions and widely 
prevalent self-perception as “exceptional” is affected by “our geography [that] has 
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shaped our psychology” (Cameron 2013a). Cameron does not make any excuses for the 
request of a special treatment, but justifies it with British historical and geographical 
settings.  
 
Home Secretary Theresa May is one of the strongest advocates for Britain leaving the 
European Convention on Human Rights, since the Article Eight of the Convention 
prohibits deporting dangerous foreign criminals under the “right to a family life” clause 
(BBC 2013a; Hennessy 2013b). She mentioned that a new immigration bill will be 
published in late 2013 “to give full legal weight to ministers’ demands” to deport a 
foreign criminal if it coincides with the need to “protect the public and control 
immigration” (Hennessy 2013b). The planned law could also contain restrictions on 
migrants coming from the ECE states, since last year [2012] a Romanian national, 
Lavinia Olmazu, who was convicted in a “multi million pound benefits fraud”, was 
allowed to stay in the country as she had a son living in Britain (Barrett 2012). The 
issue has been raised again among widely prevalent concerns about the A2 migrant 
inflow from next year and its allegedly close correlation to crime and violence. Coming 
back to Kingdon’s three streams model of public policy, this decision is accepted by the 
audience in the problem stream since “the new rules were backed unanimously by the 
House of Commons” but not by the audience in the policy stream since the bill does 
“not carry the full weight of law and because of this are routinely ignored by judges on 
the Immigration Tribunal” (Hennessy 2013b). This might refer to what Huysmans has 
called a “selective securitisation” (Huysmans 2006). 
The Conservative Party politicians are increasingly debating the need for protecting 
benefits, public services and labour market from the misuse by ECE migrants. The 
discursive construction of a direct link between benefits, housing, unemployment, NHS, 
and/or crime on the one hand and ECE immigration on the other is a relatively new 
phenomenon among the Conservative politicians. While before the general elections of 
2005 and 2010 immigration was predominantly addressed as a coherent whole, making 
explicit links only to illegal immigrants and asylum-seekers, then before the 2015 
general election this balance has considerably changed. This is due to the imminent lift 
of labour restrictions for A2 migrants, but also because UKIP is being seen to address 
the most sensitive issues among the British public in a rigorous manner, thus eroding 
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the Conservative Party support base in the upcoming elections (Freedland 2013). The 
Conservative Planning Minister Nick Boles has argued that “arrivals from Romania and 
Bulgaria will put pressure on Britain's housing and public services” and supported 
“rules about income and job prospects being tightened to prevent immigrants 
immediately claiming benefits” (Jowit 2013).  
Boris Johnson, the Mayor of London, and often considered as one of the most popular 
Conservative politicians due to his outspoken character and bold vision for the capital, 
has similarly argued that ministers should renegotiate “the current deal allowing 
migrants from the two countries to live and work in the UK from the start of 2014” 
adding to the consensus aspect in Kingdon’s problem stream on the matter (Johnson 
2013 as cited in Meredith 2013). Johnson also makes a firm prediction that 
“immigration from Bulgaria and Romania...will lead to an increase in rough sleeping of 
the kind seen from previous accession countries” which disturbs the social scene and 
dynamics of British cities (Johnson 2013 as cited in Meredith 2013).  
 
4.4. The Conservative Party Immigration Rhetoric during the EU Enlargements of 2004 
and 2007 
 
The earlier immigration speeches of the Conservative Party members address 
immigration as a whole, without the explicit focus on specific countries or regions. 
Michael Howard, the Party leader from 2003 to 2005 and one of the hard-lined 
eurosceptics during the Major government, called immigration to Britain in 2004 
“chaotic and out of control” (Howard 2004). He continues: “immigration has doubled 
under Labour” indicating Labour party’s liberal immigration policies and grave 
miscalculations with regard to the inflow of A8 nationals, although the total effect of 
mass immigration from ECE states at that point was not yet evident (Howard 2004). 
With regard to the European Union (and in the context of the EU big bang enlargement 
just months before) he mentioned that “we want to bring powers back from Brussels to 
Britain” (Howard 2004), which is a very similar rhetoric adopted by Margaret Thatcher 
who mentioned in her infamous Bruges speech in 1988: “We have not successfully 
rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a 
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European level” referring to intertextuality to absorb more substance to one’s statements 
(Thatcher 1988). The general perception of Michael Howard was that Britain should be 
able to make its own immigration rules, an idea very strongly advocated by the UKIP 
leader Nigel Farage.  
The context of the speeches delivered by the Conservative politicians in 2004 and 2005 
is important to bear in mind. The Conservative party was in opposition in the 
government and in 2004 the biggest EU enlargement took place inciting discomfort, 
insecurity and unawareness about the future among the British public. Thus the 
Conservative Party linked the two contextual aspects and built their election campaign 
on blaming the Labour government’s immigration policy, which was summed up by 
Shadow Home Secretary David Davis as “clueless, chaotic and potentially catastrophic” 
(Davis 2004). There are no explicit references to ECE migrants in Davis’s speech as 
immigration is addressed as a whole. Davis also highlights that incoming immigrants, 
possibly alluding to A8 nationals, are going “to our most overcrowded areas...burdening 
housing, health, schools and other public services” (Davis 2004)- statement heavily 
addressed by London mayor Boris Johnson a decade later with regard to ECE migrants. 
In 2005, at the same year as the general election and when migration from A8 countries 
was in rapid incline, the Conservative immigration rhetoric was garnering more 
substance. The party leader, Michael Howard, delivered his immigration speech in 
Telford less than a month before the results of the general election. He argued that 
“Britain has everything going for it” but this “British sense of tolerance and of fair play 
is...being abused” thus playing on the subconsciousness of British nationals and their 
sense of national pride (Howard 2005). Howard portrays an altruistic image of British 
immigration tradition: “For centuries we have welcomed people from around the world 
with open arms” but “millions of people...would like to settle here” and “our 
communities simply cannot successfully absorb newcomers at this rate” (Howard 2005). 
Referring to such large arguably unfounded numerical values is sowing seeds of panic 
in the community; in addition he adds that “immigration is putting a strain on our public 
services” (Howard 2005). The words “chaos” or “chaotic” were mentioned four times, 
which is significant for a single-issue speech. Similarly to UKIP’s earlier immigration 
rhetoric, the Conservative politicians, such as Shadow Home Secretary David Davis, 
talk about ECE immigration mainly in the context of mismanagement by the EU and the 
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need of member states to “take back powers to their own countries” since it “is the most 
sensible option to help Europe cope with further enlargement” (Davis 2005). Davis 
makes the first public statement from the Conservative Party political elite since 2004 
that the EU enlargement has resulted in pressures for the host state and need to be 
resolved; and includes the derogatory term “Polish plumber” (Davis 2005). At this time 
the ECE immigration was heavily figuring in the politicisation sphere- it was addressed 
and it was part of the public debate and normal politics. Solutions, as such, were not yet 
proposed. 
Michael Howard, as a Conservative Party leader, was more stable in his approach to 
immigration than his successor David Cameron. Howard considered immigration a 
problem for the “generous island nation” and even more so since the 2004 EU 
enlargement (Howard 2005a; Howard 2005b). When the Labour Party won the 2005 
general election, Howard stepped down as the party leader and in his final speech at the 
Conservative Party conference in Blackpool he mentioned that the Conservative Party 
turned the topic of “immigration the most important [issue] in British politics” and the 
British “immigration system is in shambles” and in need to be tackled immediately- 
referring to high politicisation (Howard 2005b).  What is significant in this context, 
though, is Howard’s own background as a son of a Romanian-born Jewish immigrant to 
which he makes several references in his speeches, mainly in conjunction with British 
greatness to which he owes his life to: “If it hadn’t been for Winston Churchill, and if it 
hadn’t been for Britain, I would have been one of them [those killed in the concentration 
camps] too” and “I owe everything I am to this country” (Howard 2004). 
David Cameron assumed the position of the Conservative Party leader in 2005 and in 
2006 delivered a speech to the Conservative Party Conference in Bournemouth. Since 
the Labour Party had won the 2005 general elections and UKIP was still a relatively 
marginal political force, the Conservative Party did not feel the need for a more abrasive 
rhetoric on immigration, even though the number of ECE migrants by the end of 2006 
reached almost half a million. Thus the fluctuations and gradual movement towards 
more rigorous tones in Cameron’s discursive construction of ECE immigration rhetoric 
over time is clearly evident culminating with his 2013 immigration speech. Cameron’s 
2006 speech at the Conservative Party conference was coherent and flowing, different 
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topics are joined so it is easy to follow and make logical assumptions e.g. crime is 
linked to social cohesion and the problematic issue of communities living “separate 
lives”; and social cohesion is joined to the necessity of educational reforms so that 
immigrants would learn English (Cameron 2006). Immigration itself, however, is on a 
relatively marginal position in the speech and becomes implicitly mentioned after 
environmental concerns towards the end of the public statement. David Davis, however, 
brings attention back to the immigration debate in 2007 and once again addresses the 
topic of ECE immigration in the context of EU enlargement. He attacks Labour “open-
door” policy, highlights the miscalculations made by the government regarding the 
number of inflow from A8 states and links it to direct pressure on “housing, schools, 
communities” (Davis 2007). Davis also mentions that ECE immigration has reached a 
chaotic 700 000 in just two and half years and continues that the Labour government 
has made a huge mistake in “letting in too many people who shouldn’t be here” and 
slamming “the door on those we should be helping” making an obvious statement that 
ECE migrants are not the preferential part of the inflow to Britain. This once more 
indicates the power play and subjugation of particular social groups in Fairclough’s 
social practice dimension.  
Davis’ speech is also clearly reminiscient of Margaret Thatcher, comparing the Iron 
Lady to Gordon Brown’s soft tactics and his failure to tackle immigration. What comes 
out from the Conservative speeches in general is that, although in opposition until 2010, 
a great deal of rhetoric concentrates on dissing Labour policies and government, and 
relatively little on proposing actual solutions themselves. The majority of speeches just 
accentuate the overall idea that “we will do better”, which coincides with the discursive 
practice dimension of Norman Fairclough and the nature of the “force of utterances” 
(Fairclough 1992). There are a lot of “commissive speech acts that involve promises”, 
but few are actually being put into practice (Onuf 1998: 67).   
In 2007, one can already notice the gradual shift in Cameron’s rhetoric. He gets more 
personal and talks about his travels through the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc and 
referencing “the lack of choice, the lack of freedom, the lack of expression” people in 
this area were confined to (Cameron 2007). This is an implicit discursive division 
between “us” and “them”- the superior and the inferior. Fairclough argues that this kind 
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of rhetoric refers to “imposing divisions on the world”- an idea propagated by the 
French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu in the form of  “symbolic violence” or “violence in 
the form of language” (Fairclough 2000: 48). While this kind of discursive construction 
of Eastern Europe reflects regret and guilt, in Cameron’s latest speeches this focus has 
tranformed into a negative perception of people migrating from East and Central Europe 
and a need to curb this inflow.  
In 2009, a year before the general election, Cameron addresses the death of his sick son 
as an arguably rhetorical tactic: “When such a big part of your life suddenly ends 
nothing else - nothing outside - matters” (Cameron 2009). He fittingly, however, moves 
onto highlighting British greatness and generosity and mentions that “if we want our 
country to carry on with this proud, open tradition, we’ve got to understand the 
pressures of mass immigration” (Cameron 2009). It can be argued that using inclusive 
plural pronouns like “our”, “us” and “we” creates an image of a threatened British 
identity among the British nationals and its direct link to immigration increases instant 
hostile sentiments towards incoming foreign nationals.  
Since the Conservative Party came to power and formed a coalition government with 
the Liberal Democrats in 2010, their rhetoric on immigration was generally confined to 
“non-EU migration, bogus students and family visa/economic routes”; and immigration 
as a whole, including the ECE migrants, which has “led to serious social impacts in 
some areas, with pressure being placed on key public services such as schools, the 
health service, transport, housing and welfare” (May 2010; Cameron 2010). May and 
Cameron both address the touchy subject of integration in Britain, or more specifically 
the lack of it, and subsequent “community tensions” it has created (May 2010; Cameron 
2010; May 2012b). This problem is directly linked to the necessary requirement to learn 
the English language and the need to review the “language requirements across the 
immigration system with a view to tightening them further” (May 2010). In her later 
speeches May addresses the same issue, referring to intertextuality, yet solutions have 
not been provided: “After years of mass immigration, we now face the enormous task of 
building an integrated, cohesive society” and asks “how can people build relationships 
with their neighbours if they can’t even speak the same language? ” (May 2012b). Very 
common for Conservative Party politicians is the portrayal of a hopeful image for the 
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future, e.g. “Our country, Britain, is on the rise”; “We can make Britain the best place in 
the world” (Cameron 2012); “We are being positive about our plans” (Howard 2005b); 
“We will make Britain more secure and bring down crime”...“It can be done. It must be 
done. It will be done” (Davis 2004). This is a significant characteristic of Conservative 
rhetoric which pertains to Fairclough’s textual and discursive practice dimensions. This 
is in a stark contrast to UKIP politicians and especially to Nigel Farage’s discursive 
constructions, who is very blunt-spoken and does not paint a hopeful and agreeable 
picture of the future of Britain, but rather addresses the downfall of the country if 
immigration will not be tackled- an integral element of the CS securitisation logic.  
 
Social cohesion- an underlying feature of many Conservative politicians’ speeches- is 
actually most vocally addressed by David Cameron in his 2011 Munich speech, which 
was not explicitly about ECE immigration to Britain, but nevertheless needs to be 
examined as it is an important landmark speech in the development of British 
immigration policy. Indeed there are two underlying themes in David Cameron’s 
speech: the securitisation of immigration (although with reference to religious 
extremism); and multiculturalism, linked to the question of national identity and 
solidarity, which alludes to the well elaborated three-dimensional model of discourse. 
Particularly important is Cameron’s condemnation of what he called the “hands-off 
tolerance” in Britain. Perhaps the most infamous line of the speech is a call for 
“muscular liberalism”, which condemns the “passive tolerance” of recent decades (very 
similar to his “hard” versus “soft” touch rhetoric of 2013) (Cameron 2011a). To fully 
understand Cameron, it is essential to examine what he means by “muscular liberalism”. 
Cameron says that a “muscular” approach suggests “the unambiguous and hard-nosed” 
defence of liberty and active promotion of certain values such as “freedom of speech, 
freedom of worship, the rule of law and democracy” but also following the rules of the 
host society, learning the language and “giving back” to the society to function properly 
in the new social order, while maintaining a certain degree of cultural distinctiveness 
(Cameron, 2011a). The idea behind this proclamation is that migrants cannot just enter 
the country and abuse the system, but need to be a beneficial force and contribute to the 
welfare of the society. This thought has been clearly articulated in Cameron’s 2013 
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immigration speech in Ipswich, where he mentioned that “something for nothing” 
culture must stop. These ideas refer to previously discussed intertextuality and the 
evolution of rhetoric towards a more rigid stance.  Cameron’s speech at the Munich 
Security Conference in 2011 arguably echoed the ideas once propagated by Enoch 
Powell, both warning of dangerous fragmentation within society and the weakening of 
national solidarity. A considerable transformation, however, is that immigration has 
become detached from race, especially so as the vast numbers of immigrants in Britain 
today are from Europe (Fekete 2001). It is also ironic that the very people that were the 
target of Powell’s attack are now themselves feeling resentful of the latest wave of 
immigrants from Eastern Europe, who are believed to threaten their welfare, safety and 
put a pressure on social services leading to tensions and possible increase in the levels 
of crime in the community (Omaar 2008; Grillo 2010). 
Therefore, Cameron’s Munich proclamation is a landmark speech from where one could 
actually start following the gradual change of the Conservative ECE immigration 
rhetoric towards a more rigorous stance and UKIP’s influence on the discursive 
construction of the Conservative elite’s language. From 2011 ECE migration is being 
already explicitly referenced: “more than one million people from those countries have 
come to live and work in the UK – a huge number”; “That's the largest influx of people 
Britain has ever had…and it has placed real pressures on communities up and down the 
country” (Cameron 2011b). While Cameron only addresses the problem, UKIP leader 
Nigel Farage offers a solution for controlling the inflow of migrants: “He [Cameron] 
has to face the fact that we have a total open door to the whole of Eastern Europe and 
that from May 1, our social security rules change meaning that you can come from 
Poland [or any other A8 countries] and automatically qualify for benefits...while we are 
part of the European Union, we cannot have our own immigration policy” (Farage 
2011a). In another statement Farage mentions the “massive oversupply of unskilled 
labour for the last 5 or 6 years” and warns for “another massive wave of immigrants 
coming in” (Farage 2011b). It can be argued that “adjectives with negative polarity”, 
often used by Nigel Farage [such as “a massive wave of migrants” or “rampant 
immigration”],  contribute to “heightening the sense of urgency and crisis” (Mautner 
2008: 38). Cameron maintains that “if and when new countries join the European 
Union, transitional controls will be put in place” (Cameron 2011b). Farage, however, 
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argues that transitional measures do not restrict the inflow of migrants from the EU, it 
only postpones it for a couple of years (Farage 2011a). He adds that the main focus of 
the government is only on “one part of the immigration problem” as it ignores the “total 
open door” to ECE migrants (2011a). This is a direct call from UKIP for a more focused 
attention from the coalition government to ECE immigration and its repercussions for 
Britain. Cameron also mentions for the first time that immigration has become a “front-
ranked political issue” in the country- referring to high politicisation (Cameron 2011c). 
Theresa May shares this concern and constructs direct links between immigration and a 
pressure on “infrastructure...housing stock and transport system” as well as “public 
services...schools and hospitals”- our “communities struggle to cope with this rapid 
change” (May 2011; May 2012a). Furthermore, since 2011, Cameron’s fears over 
competitors becomes increasingly evident. It can be seen from the gradual change in his 
EU and immigration rhetoric, but also due to his explicit references to UKIP, such as: 
“If people don’t feel that mainstream political parties understand these issues they will 
turn instead to those who seek to exploit these issues to create social unrest” (Cameron 
2011c). The reference to UKIP is linked to a derogative term “social unrest”, which is 
important from the textual dimension, but also from the social practice dimension in 
terms of an increasing power struggle between the parties.  
In 2012, Theresa May emphasises the need to “restrict the demand for European 
workers from British employers”, which indicates a clear concern about the numbers 
coming in from ECE states and taking British jobs. She adds that “immigration puts a 
downward pressure on wages”, which means “more workers competing for a limited 
number of low-skilled jobs” (May 2012b). May addresses the British working class, the 
core of British identity, to create tension and a sense of urgency. 
 
4.5. UKIP- The Discursive Construction of Immigration Rhetoric 
 
UKIP is a British right-wing populist party whose main policy objectives include 
leaving the European Union to regain control over its own borders and free itself from 
the chains of EU regulations, withdrawing from the European Convention of Human 
Rights and the European Convention on Refugees to be able to deport foreign criminals, 
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and “introduce a five year freeze on immigration for permanent settlement” 
(www.ukip.org). UKIP’s sudden rise in popularity has come at a time when the British 
public is ripe for persuasion. People are disappointed in the mainstream party polices, 
their failure to tackle immigration and protect the erosion of national solidarity and 
British identity. The Conservative and Labour parties are engaged in accusing each 
other of “helplessness and incompetence” which has resulted in “shambolic 
immigration” policies (Mautner 2008: 38).  
UKIP rhetoric was, similarly to that of the Conservative Party, analysed within a time-
frame of 9 years, from 2004 until the present day [2013] bearing in mind the aspects 
highlighted by Norman Fairclough in his three-dimensional model. The earlier 
discursive construction of immigration rhetoric has provided considerably less 
substance for analysis due to UKIP’s relatively marginal position in British politics. 
Furthermore, the main focus of UKIP’s earlier manifestos and public rhetoric have been 
first and foremost withdrawal from the European Union and then problems deriving 
from this membership, whether political, social or economic. An illustrative example is 
Roger Knapman’s (UKIP leader from 2002-2006) speech on the EU constitution, signed 
by all 25 member states in 2004 but never ratified. He saw the Constitution further 
eroding “the sovereignty of the United Kingdom”, and setting “a dangerous precedent 
for the future” (Knapman 2004). He then adds that “Great Britain does not need a 
European constitution which reverses the legal rights and privileges of British citizens” 
by “... implementing its proposals on immigration, justice and home affairs” (Knapman 
2004). Knapman addresses the integral element of security- danger, but not as a direct 
result of immigration, but rather as something very prevalent in the future if Britain 
remains to be confined to EU regulations.  
This focal point has shifted towards immigration from 2007 putting the issue at the 
heart of anti-EU arguments (on the unit level), making it the number one issue for the 
party by 2013 local elections (largely affected by the ending of transitional measures for 
Bulgaria and Romania). Illustrative examples can be found from the evolution towards 
immigration-centred discourse in manifestos (see next section) as well as Nigel Farage’s 
public statements.   
 62 
 
In 2007 Farage warned that immigration, which he said was an “absolute mess”, was 
leading to an increase in community tension and there “needs to be a five-year 
moratorium on any new immigration to this country” (Farage 2007). He added that the 
current movement of people from Eastern Europe “dwarfed anything that has ever 
happened in our history” alluding to the repercussions of the 2004 EU enlargement and 
the highest influx of ECE nationals in 2007 since the enlargement. Farage provokes 
insecurity by arguing that ECE immigration is a problem and needs to be contained due 
to the “increase in social tension”, “unfair burden on the citizen” and “pressure on 
public services” (Farage 2007). Gerard Batten, London-based UKIP MEP, proposed 
dispersing immigrants in Britain in 2008 and sending them to less-populated areas, 
rather than allowing them to overcrowd London. He argued that “in recent years”- 
alluding to post-EU enlargement ECE migrant inflow- “the situation [immigration] has 
got out of control and the pressures on housing, transport and the infrastructure 
generally have become intolerable” (Batten 2008 as cited in Crerar 2008). This is 
arguably a very strong statement, usually avoided by mainstream politicians, since it 
echoes the distinguishing feature of the securitisation theory that “if the problem is not 
handled now it will be too late”- it will reach a “point of no return” and have 
unmanageable consequences (Buzan et al. 1998: 25-26). 
In 2013, when the concern about the imminent A2 migrant inflow is more prevalent 
than ever, Farage begins heavily using the “open door” metaphor and explicitly 
maintains that the most urgent debate in Britain is the debate about immigration: 
“People in Britain are shocked at the change in every single city and market town since 
we opened the doors to Eastern Europe in 2004”- a statement clearly reminiscent of 
Enoch Powell (Farage 2013a). In a speech to the UKIP spring conference in March 
2013, Farage was attacking all three main British political parties with regard to their 
“soft touch” on ECE immigration policies: “They all support that door being flung ever 
wider open to the 29 million people from Bulgaria and Romania” (Farage 2013b). The 
emphasis on the figure “29 million” can be seen as a rhetorical tactic to create a sense of 
heightened priority and drama among the British audience. It is clear that the entire 
populations of A2 countries (comprising 29 million people) will not migrate to Great 
Britain- this measure is being used to exploit the fears of an average Briton by 
highlighting a statement that is technically correct, but completely misleading (Blinder 
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2013). Farage adds that it is an “outrage” that Bulgarian and Romanian nationals can 
“claim all the benefits that nationals can” and Britain should take back the control over 
its own borders (Farage 2013b). He ends with a powerful and resounding remark: “We 
will fight this battle”, which can be seen as an effort to securitise ECE immigration 
(Farage 2013b).  
While in his earlier speeches, Farage has avoided making explicit links between crime 
and immigration and thus making ECE migration a direct security matter, in April 2013, 
just after returning from his trip to Bulgaria and being to Romania in the past, he argues 
that “you’ve got to see the poverty in these countries to believe it...millions of people 
living in misery”, alluding to the subconscious fact that Britain is being threatened by 
all these millions of poor people (Farage 2013c). Farage’s discursive construction of 
threat and insecurity serves to “sweepingly disparage whole countries” such as Romania 
and Bulgaria directly borrowing from the power play tactic of Norman Fairclough and 
his social practice dimension (Mautner 2008: 38). Farage direcly links this statement to 
a reminder that Britain will lift labour restrictions for A2 nationals in 2014, which 
allows the audience to make their own conclusions and indicates well elaborated 
discursive construction of fear and insecurity. These sentiments have recently been 
echoed by Conservative politicians, such as John Baron MP, who maintains that a 
“surge of immigration” from these countries is inevitable since the minimum wage in 
Britain is “five to six times higher...than it is in Bulgaria or Romania” (Jowit 2013).  
Farage continues: “we...do need to say NO to an open door... to masses of unskilled 
labour” especially because London is currently “in the middle of Romanian crime 
epidemic- for only 80 000 Romanians living in Britain at the moment in the 
Metropolitan Police area alone there have been nearly 30 000 Romanian arrests in the 
last 5 years” (Farage 2013c). These bold statements are delivered in the midst of local 
elections and well in advance of the European Parliament elections in 2014 and the 
general election of 2015, all of which will arguably bring unexpected results due to 
UKIP’s sudden surge in the British political terrain and growing empathy among the 
wider public towards the party as well as increasing sense of concern and drama in the 
county. On BBC Question Time, Farage adds that “with the first wave there will be a lot 
of criminals who will come to Britain”- making it a fact, rather than a prediction (Farage 
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2013c). Especially significant is comparison and contrast to Conservative politician 
Sajid David, currently the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, sitting on the same panel 
with Farage, who mentions that the Romanian and Bulgarian immigration is a problem, 
but since Britain cannot stem the flow according to EU rules, the only solution is 
making the country unattractive for ECE immigrants. This is a clear indication that ECE 
migration is unwanted and embodies a great and increasing concern for Great Britain. 
David also mentions that Cameron’s EU referendum has been proposed exactly due to 
this reason- the Conservative Party wants “a new kind of relationship” with the EU or 
“withdraw altogether” (Farage 2013c).  
Therefore UKIP clearly makes a campaign out of exploiting “fears over mass 
immigration from Romania and Bulgaria” by linking it to crime and featuring the issue 
as a focal point in the local elections in May 2013, European Parliament elections in 
2014 and British general elections in 2015, thus posing a significant electoral threat to 
the Conservative Party (Morris 2013). UKIP takes the issue of ECE immigration to the 
borderline of securitisation in the spectrum proposed by Buzan et al. (1998) due to 
direct discursive links to crime and violence, welfare, jobs and the British identity. 
Audience support indicates some aspects of successful securitisation. At the same time, 
UKIP does not have the resources to make the proposed changes, which is a 
considerable weakness in the completion of the securitisation process. 
 
4.6. Manifestos- the Construction of Verbal Declarations 
 
The Conservative election manifesto of 2005 mentioned the topic of “immigration” on 
the front cover as well as three times in the foreword. The “out-of-control immigration 
system”, however, was predominantly addressed within the context of asylum-seekers 
and illegal immigration (The Conservative Party 2005: 1). Immigration was also briefly 
mentioned with regard to the NHS and its abuse by non-British nationals- NHS is “a 
national health service not a world health service” (The Conservative Party 2005: 13). 
The abuse of the system was also mainly linked to non-EU migrants- an idea that has 
now expanded to EU nationals, most visible in David Cameron’s latest speeches. 
Immigration as a separate topic is mentioned after taxes, education, healthcare and 
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crime, but still linked to matters pertaining to non-EU nationals (e.g. “Australian-style 
points system for work permits”; “annual immigration limit”: “asylum seekers’ 
applications”; “controlled borders”) (The Conservative Party 2005: 19). The party 
manifesto published during the next election cycle in 2010 does not address the 
immigration topic separately, but ties it to the economy and crime sections. What is 
significant, however, is that the 130-page manifesto explicitly mentions EU migration in 
conjunction with EU enlargement: we will introduce “transitional controls as a matter of 
course in the future for all new EU Member States” and “we do not need to attract 
people to do jobs that could be carried out by British citizens” (The Conservative Party 
2010: 21). Social cohesion has also been highlighted together with the necessity of 
embracing British core values as well as the need of learning the English language for 
an immigrant to function as a contributing member of society.  
Even UKIP’s rhetoric and stance on ECE immigration has evolved over time. While the 
2005 manifesto had pushed immigration on the seventh page, after the economy, 
healthcare and welfare, and education (UKIP 2005), then the 2010 general election 
manifesto presented concern for European immigration already on the fifth page (UKIP 
2010). The 2013 local election manifesto placed the issue on the front cover in 
screaming font, which read “Open door immigration is crippling local services in the 
UK” (UKIP 2013). The first sentence that really catches the eye on the latest manifesto 
is printed on a red background in white font, similar to traffic stop signs that are familiar 
to everyone. It reads “On January 1st 2014, The UK will open its door to unlimited 
numbers of people from Romania and Bulgaria” (UKIP 2013). In a smaller font, just 
below the eye-catching headline, one can read “Nearly a quarter of all European 
nationals living in the UK are not working...551,000 out of 2.3 million are economically 
inactive and 146,000 have never worked in this country...The figure of those who have 
never worked has risen by 30% since 2008” (UKIP 2013). None of the previous UKIP 
manifestos have made such a strong one-topic statement on the front cover. It shows 
that with the lifting of labour restrictions to Romanian and Bulgarian nationals on the 
horizon, immigration discourse becomes more intense and possible repercussions much 
more concerning. At this point, however, the earlier discussed economic situation must 
be addressed, which further enforces the rigorous construction of discourse and 
accentuates the fear of more immigration. This is in contrast to 2004 and 2005, for 
 66 
 
example, when Britain was in need of labour force from ECE states and the economy 
was in considerably better shape.  
The placement of UKIP and the Conservative Party on the politicised-securitised 
spectrum according to their manifestos indicate a clear contrast. Since (ECE) 
immigration has been mentioned in the Conservative manifestos but not explicitly 
linked to societal security, it can be comfortably located in the politicised sphere; 
whereas UKIP makes clear references to societal security in its latest manifesto and thus 
should be placed in the securitisation domain. This thought should be elaborated further 
in conjunction with crime and welfare- two of the integral aspects in the societal 
security sector.      
 
4.7. Explicit Links to Crime and Welfare in the Conservative and UKIP discourse 
 
Diane James, UKIP candidate in the Eastleigh by-election, which brought along a 
humiliating defeat for the Conservative Party has explicitly linked Romanian 
immigration to crime: “We are not just talking about pressure on services from 
immigration but also, and I have to say it, the crime associated with Romanians”. She 
continues that during the Olympics one of the biggest concerns was “Romanian 
criminal gangs pick-pocketing” (James as cited in the press association in the Guardian 
2013a). Godfrey Bloom, UKIP MEP, has expressed similar discontent towards 
Romanian nationals. He writes that United Kingdom can no longer afford open borders 
to EU nationals, especially due to the increased levels of crime and violence associated 
with Romanian nationals: “Currently 90 per cent of cash point fraud is allegedly 
perpetrated by Romanian gangs” and “they are said to exploit children to beg and steal” 
(Bloom 2013). Bloom also explicitly links A2 nationals to “British joblessness”, “strain 
on the infrastructure” and “potential crime explosion” and calls Home Secretary 
Theresa May to “tear up the treaty” that lifts labour restrictions for Bulgarian and 
Romanian nationals- a proposal indicating “extraordinary measures” (Bloom 2013).  
The media has an important contributing factor to this debate. In various publications it 
has been argued that “Eastern European migrants are arriving in London in 
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unprecedented numbers, flooding the capital with beggars...pickpockets before the 
Olympics” and “organised crime gangs are believed to be transporting coach loads of 
Romanians into the country with instructions to work a pre-allocated 'pitch'” (Hodge 
2012). The media often highlights quotes uttered by the British political elite: “They 
[Eastern Europeans] see rich pickings in Britain because there are no controls” (Khalid 
Mahmood, Conservative MP for Perry Barr in the Guardian as cited by Alleyne 2012 ). 
In the same article, it has been highlighted that “Romanians were the most prolific 
offenders last year [2011], with...1,329 detained”, which is an astonishing number 
considering the relatively small proportion of Romanian nationals in the total UK 
population (Alleyne 2012). It has also been addressed by the Guardian that “a growing 
number of Conservative MPs now believe the UK should block the lifting of restrictions 
[for Bulgarian and Romanian nationals] even if it were to prompt a row with the 
European commission”, which is a measure above normal everyday politics and could 
be considered “extraordinary” if implemented (Boffey and Helm 2013). 
Similarly to highlighting explicit links between ECE immigration and crime, it has been 
done by UKIP politicians between immigration and abuse of the British welfare system. 
Economic concerns, as a matter of fact, are often perceived as the main contributor to 
insecurity among the British public since the effect of migration on the economy is 
more immediate than, for example, on British national identity.  
Since EU member states can only impose transitional measures for the newcomers up to 
seven years, on 1 May 2011, the British government was “forced to scrap safeguards on 
receiving handouts” (Hough and Whitehead 2011). This means that the requirement for 
the Workers Registration Scheme (WRS) was lifted and all A8 nationals could access 
“Jobseeker’s Allowance, council tax help and housing benefits” on the same account as 
British nationals (Kennedy 2011; Hough and Whitehead 2011). Nigel Farage instantly 
made a strong case from the abolishment of restrictions linking it to “benefit tourism”, 
thus paving the way for his recent success in 2013 local elections and biggest surge in 
polls since the party’s establishment in 1993. Cameron, however, replied with his 2013 
immigration speech and publicly proposed tougher policies on benefits, housing and 
health care. What is significant, though, is that the push to the Conservatives was given 
through language practiced by UKIP and its success as a result of this linguistic 
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manufacture. As Fairclough maintains: “Political struggles have always been partly 
struggles over the dominant language”- a statement directly linked to his three-
dimensional model, power and ideology (Fairclough 2000: 3). 
Migrants are often depicted through negative polarity and seen as “free riders”, 
“scroungers” or “bogus”, trying “to exploit the socioeconomic fabric of the host 
European societies” (Karyotis 2011: 21; Mautner 2008). Unlawful migrants are coming 
up with new ways to exploit the British welfare system. These include “trafficking 
homeless people to the UK and then taking their passports so they can be used to 
receive state handouts” or “printing bogus birth certificates” to “claim...benefits for non-
existent children” (Beckford 2008). Eastern European migrants are already claiming 
millions of pounds from the British welfare system, out of which there is an unknown 
number of bogus schemes (Karyotis 2011). A number of changes, however, are being 
implemented to tackle this problem and avoid unlawful schemes to go through. These 
include “tighter control on the issue of claim forms, fraud awareness training for staff, 
and deploying compliance officers in tax credit call centres” (Beckford 2008).  
The gradually increasing local resentment and competition over jobs, healthcare, 
housing and welfare lead to what has become known as “welfare chauvisnism” or the 
“privileging of national citizens in the distribution of social goods” (Huysmans 2006: 
77). Migrants are seen to overburden the “already dilapidated welfare system” and thus 
they are not anymore simply rivals “but illegitimate recipients or claimants of socio-
economic rights” (Karyotis 2011: 21; Huysmans 2006: 77). This means that there is a 
growing sentiment not only among the wider public, but also among specialists and 
policy-makers that a “community should first and foremost provide benefits and welfare 
for its own people”, linking the problem to all three Kingdon’s streams (Huysmans 
2000: 768-769). This has also been implemented in law and EU policies, which support 
the gradual shift towards “welfare chauvinism” and accepts the changes taking place in 
contemporary Western societies. Huysmans argues that “in this context these policies 
facilitate the creation of migration as a destabilising or dangerous challenge to West 
European societies” (Huysmans 2000: 753). Cameron often addresses immigration 
problems in close conjunction with welfare: “Immigration and welfare reform are two 
sides of the same coin...we will never control immigration properly unless we tackle 
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welfare dependency” (Cameron 2011b) and “immigration has compounded the failure 
of our welfare system” (Cameron 2011c).  
4.8. The Power Game between UKIP and the Conservative Party  
 
UKIP’s influence on the Conservatives is imperative from the context of Fairclough’s 
social practice dimension and power relations in British politics. It allows one to 
analyse the gradual success of UKIP and how discursive practices are constructed in 
furthering the interests of particular political parties.  
UKIP’s primary objective, since its foundation in 1993, has been “withdrawal from the 
EU to regain our [Britain’s] self-governing democracy” (www.ukip.org). Thus it has 
generally been considered a single-issue party with the main aim of freeing Britain from 
the chains of EU regulations, and acclaimed the title of a “protest party”, which 
generally accumulated votes and support in opinion polls when the general public was 
not satisfied how the country is being run by mainstream parties.  
This perception, however, has recently been through turbulent changes. It has been 
argued that “UKIP should no longer be seen as a protest party” since it offers 
considerable policy solutions in areas such as education, the environment, economy and 
taxes, in addition to its original focus on the EU and immigration. As Nigel Farage 
himself argues: “It is not about protest voting anymore... now it is about policy...putting 
forward positive, alternative policies, that will make this country a better place” (Farage 
2013b).  
The party that was described as a bunch of “fruitcakes, loonies and closet racists” by 
David Cameron in 2006 which echoed his predecessor, Michael Howard, who saw the 
UKIP members as “cranks and gadflies” is now posing a significant electoral threat to 
mainstream parties in 2015 (Assinder 2006; Parker 2013).  
After its strongest performance ever in the 2013 local elections, UKIP leader Nigel 
Farage “announced the arrival of four-party politics in Britain” when the party garnered 
nearly 25 per cent of the votes (Parker 2013). Nigel Farage also declared that the British 
politics is on the course of a change, which is clearly indicated by the “biggest surge by 
a fourth party in England since the second world war” (Watt 2013a; White 2013).  
 70 
 
The party won 147 council seats, a huge rise from just 7 seats in 2009. Furthermore, 
UKIP “fielded 1700 candidates, three times the number that stood in 2009” (BBC 2009; 
The Guardian 2013b). Farage maintained: “Britain is in a mess and we need radical 
reform...There is now a settled majority that wants us to get our country back” (Watt 
2013a). He uses strong and effective language, referring to the mishaps of the 
mainstream parties and highlighting the recent successes of his own party, thus creating 
a conception that UKIP is the new and right way to restore the British greatness. This is 
a statement indicating the fluctuation of power relations in the country- an integral 
element in Fairclough’s third dimension. 
The most evident influence of UKIP’s success over the Conservative Party was 
arguably the latter’s humiliating defeat in the Eastleigh by-election on the 28th of 
February 2013. UKIP made its best ever parliamentary perfomance gaining 27.8 per 
cent of the votes, leaving them second just behind the Liberal Democrat candidate and 
pushing the Conservative candidate to the third place (Rogers 2013). It is even more 
significant since Eastleigh is a vital seat for the Conservative Party because “since its 
creation in 1955, they have never won a general election without it” (Freedland 2013). 
Andrew Rawnsley of the Guardian argues that when it comes to debating immigration, 
a “conspiracy of silence” has been replaced by a “conspiracy of noise” indicating high 
politicisation of the issue (Rawnsley 2013). This is largely due to the active emphasis of 
the UKIP political leadership on the issue. Lord Ashcroft has mentioned that the 
primary attraction of UKIP is the fact that “it will say things that need to be said but 
others are scared to say” thus shaking the political terrain of Britain (Ashcroft 2012). It 
seems, however, that UKIP does address the issues that really matter and are concerning 
the British public. This can be seen from David Cameron’s decision to propose an EU 
referendum and deliver an immigration speech, just a month after the Eastleigh by-
election arguing that British immigration policies need considerable alterations. The 
outcome of this approach, though, has been discussed by the Conservative historian Tim 
Bale: “Rather than shooting Nigel Farage’s fox, all Cameron has done is feed it” 
(Freedland 2013). This statement has arguably solid foundation, which is clearly 
indicated by an opinion poll conducted by Lord Ashcroft in 2012 (n: 20 000): “The 
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research finds that 12% of those who voted for the Conservative Party in 2010 now 
[2012] say they would vote UKIP in an election tomorrow” (Ashcroft 2012).   
Ian Birrell, a former speechwriter for David Cameron, and thus knowing the tricks of 
the speech trade, argues that Cameron’s immigration speech in March 2013 used 
“buzzwords beloved by focus groups” thus skillfully “exploiting voters’ fears” (Birrell 
2013). He argues that the seeds for Cameron’s visible and sudden change of rhetoric 
were planted by UKIP’s rapid increase in popularity among the British public. Birrell 
maintains that “suddenly he [Nigel Farage] seems to be running the country”- all three 
mainstream parties running at its tail (Birrell 2013).  
 
5. Audience acceptance through John Kingdon’s “three streams model” 
The audience reception for politicisation and practical attempts for securitisation by 
both parties were analysed from the perspective of Kingdon’s three streams model, 
which firstly addresses the British political elite: the Cabinet, party members, MEP’s, 
policy-makers in the problem stream; secondly specialists, think tanks and researchers 
as well as policy solutions and proposals in the policy stream; and finally the public 
opinion and election results in the political stream. Some of the acceptance dynamics 
with regard to particular speech acts and proposals were already discussed. The 
following section, however, attempts to provide a more clear empirical overview of one 
of the most underdeveloped concepts of the securitisation framework.  
 
5.1. Problem Stream 
 
In Kingdon’s problem stream, the main question to be asked is whether the political 
elite of the country has a coherent and consistent political discourse on the matter of 
ECE immigration. Do they represent many voices along the lines of a party or is there a 
prevalent general consensus on the issue? Since both political parties under observation 
lean towards the right-wing politics, the overall sentiments towards immigration follow 
similar lines. There are, however, very different methods for linguistic manufacture, 
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production and presentation for texts, which have been already discussed in the previous 
sections of the thesis. 
Home Secretary Theresa May, a strong advocate for Britain leaving the European 
Convention on Human Rights, has also indicated her keenness “to press for an end to 
the free movement of EU workers” (BBC 2013a; Barrett and Freeman 2012). 
Furthermore, in April 2013, a month after Cameron’s landmark immigration speech, 
May, backed by German, Austrian and the Netherlands’ counterparts, “wrote to the 
European Commission demanding tighter restrictions on access to welfare benefits and 
other state-funded services for EU migrants” (Watefield 2013). In this joint letter, the 
four countries maintained that migrants from the European Union and particularly, the 
latest additions to the Union from ECE states “are putting considerable strain on 
schools, healthcare and the welfare state” (Waterfield 2013). This move can be seen as a 
measure above normal, everyday politics, since more stringent measures are claimed for 
and thus referring to an attempt to take the issue to the securitisation sphere. If the 
commission had responded affirmatively, then it would have created a platform for the 
implementation of extraordinary measures as proposed by Buzan and his collaborators. 
The Commission, however, “responded with a proposal for a new directive to make it 
easier for people to exercise their rights in practice in defiance of British claims that the 
current rules on free movement are being abused by migrants” (Waterfield 2013). 
With regard to the claims of EU migrants abusing the British welfare system and 
feeding into what has become known as “benefit tourism”, an overall consensus 
prevails.  As discussed earlier the “EU social security coordination rules (Regulation EC 
883/2004) and the EU directive on the free movement of EU citizens (Directive 
2004/38/EC)” maintain that a EU country “cannot restrict the access to social security 
benefits” of another member state nationals (Kennedy 2011: 17).  Great Britain, 
however has imposed the so-called “right to reside” test for EU nationals to qualify for 
these social security benefits, which directly contravene the EU law since “Article 425 of 
                                                          
25
 Article 4 Equality of treatment: Unless otherwise provided for by this Regulation, persons to whom this 
Regulation applies shall enjoy the same benefits and be subject to the same obligations under the 
legislation of any Member State as the nationals thereof (Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council) 
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this Regulation [Regulation EC 883/2004] prohibits indirect discrimination through the 
requirement for non-UK citizens to pass an additional right to reside test” (Kennedy 
2011: 17). These directives have been ferociously disputed by Iain Duncan Smith, the 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions and a former leader of the Conservative Party 
(2001-2003), who argues that giving up the “right to reside” test as asked by the EU 
“pose a fundamental challenge to the UK’s social contract” (Smith 2011). He added that 
this might result in the “British taxpayer paying out over £2 billion extra a year in 
benefits to people who have no connection to our country” (Smith 2011). This amount, 
however, is arguably a considerable overestimation and referenced in the hope to incite 
a sense of panic and drama to justify the measures that support the test in the UK- an 
integral element of a securitising move. 
Similarly, London’s mayor and one of the most well-known Conservative politicians 
Boris Johnson has supported all proposed tough measures regarding ECE immigration 
and recently argued that “Cameron was right to stop people leeching off the system” 
(Wintour 2013).  
Furthermore, Theresa May has proposed a new law, which allows to deport foreign 
criminals, in opposition to the Article Eight of The European Convention on Human 
Rights (and thus her proposal for withdrawal) which is currently being supported by 
“not only from within the Conservative Party, but also from the Liberal Democracts and 
the Labour Party” indicating strong cohesion and consensus in the problem stream 
regarding the matter (Hennessy 2013b). But as discussed earlier, the issue was rejected 
by the audience in the policy stream since “Judges were denying the democratic and 
legal validity of ministers’ moves” (Hennessy 2013b). May proposed to overstep this 
opinion and work towards a new immigration bill to “give full legal weight to ministers’ 
demands that foreign criminals should not routinely be able to dodge deportation by 
citing Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights” (Hennessy 2013b).  
Thus Theresa May is a strong advocate for more stringent measures regarding British 
immigration policies and eager to take the issue above the normal, everyday policy-
making when deemed to be in contrast to British values an traditions. 
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Overall there seems to be a cross-party consensus on the matter of ECE immigration 
among the Tories, which is even extending beyond the party lines to the Labour and 
Liberal Democrat spheres who are also re-crafting their policies (not to mention UKIP 
whose once marginal ideas are increasingly becoming mainstream) (Lazarowicz 2013).  
 
5.2. Policy Stream 
 
The general consensus in the policy stream is that ECE immigration is an increasing 
concern in the country especially ahead of the upcoming end to Bulgarian and 
Romanian transitional measures. This, however, is a rather recent development. 
As already discussed the only restriction imposed on A8 nationals in 2004 is that for 
working in the UK, they must be registered to the Worker Registration Scheme (WRS). 
The idea behind the Scheme was to “monitor the scale, geography and labour market 
characteristics of A8 migrants in the UK” (McCollum and Findlay 2012: 16). Britain 
was the only country, together with Ireland and Sweden that decided not to impose 
transitional measures for the countries that joined the EU in 2004. Thus, it could be 
argued that ECE immigration was not perceived as a problem at the time and not posing 
any significant effects on the British societal values, traditional ways of life and key 
institutions. These sentiments, however, went through a rapid transformation due to 
grave underestimation of the number of inflow from A8 states, which in just two years 
reached almost half a million. When Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007, the 
British government decided to impose restrictions on their access to the labour market 
and welfare system, which indicates already prevalent concerns about the immigrant 
impact on British key institutions. The A2 nationals have to sign up for a “worker 
authorisation document” (either an accession worker card or a seasonal agricultural 
worker card) before they commence employment in the UK (Kennedy 2011).  
The restrictions were initially in place until 2011, but were extended up to 31 December 
2013 (BBC 2011). Sir Andrew Green, chairman of Migration Watch UK, strongly 
supported this decision by arguing that “this is absolutely the right decision...With 2.5 
million people unemployed, it would be absurd to open our borders yet again to more 
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unskilled workers” (BBC 2011). These measures, however, will be lifted in the 
beginning of 2014 in accordance with the EU law and cannot be extended. The ending 
of restrictions also applies to key benefits such a Jobseeker’s Allowance, council tax 
benefit and housing benefit. The proposals for extension have been addressed by many 
politicians and specialists in the problem and policy streams respectively, but as long as 
this does not happen, the process of securitisation remains incomplete in this regard.  
Experts on the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) agree that “immigration is likely 
to rise when the restrictions [for Bulgaria and Romania] are lifted, and have warned it 
will have a negative effect on the job market in Britain” (Barrett and Freeman 2012).  
Similarly, Sir Andrew Green, director of MigrationWatch UK, said: “I think there could 
be a significant spike from Romania and Bulgaria, particularly as the ecomonies in 
other parts of the EU are suffering serious difficulties” and “we need a further five year 
extension of the transitional arrangements. Britain has done our bit with Eastern 
European migrants - we have taken far more than any other country - and we could 
justify a special case for such an extension” (Barrett and Freeman 2012). This “special 
case” rhetoric is an important discursive tactic integral to the British mindset and 
“exceptional” political nature.  
Life in the UK citizenship test was introduced in 2004 and it came into force in 2005. 
This test was meant for migrants seeking naturalisation or a permanent settlement in the 
United Kingdom
26
. “The policy driver behind the changes” according to Saggar and 
Somerville “has been rising numbers of immigrants” and a sudden influx that started in 
2004 with the enlargement of the EU (Saggar and Somerville 2012: 16). What is 
significant, however, is that since Cameron’s immigration speech in 2013, the test has 
been tightened to include the English language test- a change implemented from 
October 2013 (BBC 2013b). This policy change does indicate a sense of heightened 
tension and concern about the British identity and integration and is especially 
significant since securitisation often occurs through the imposition of new regulations.  
In addition to the proposed negative advertising campaign to influence Romanians and 
Bulgarians not to migrate to the UK, the Home Secretary “also floated the idea of a cash 
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 For more information, see http://lifeintheuktest.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/  
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bond for EU migrants coming to Britain, which would then be paid back if they do not 
claim benefits” (Lazarowicz 2013). These two ideas, however, have received very 
mixed reviews across the political spectrum, having supporters and opponents from all 
parties, thus making the audience acceptance aspect difficult to judge.  
 
5.3. Politics Stream 
 
Over the last decades immigration has been a sensitive topic in Britain, arguably 
affecting the key social institutions, the infrastructure, labour market and eroding British 
national identity. The EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007, however, have fuelled these 
sentiments. As Geddes argues: “The 21st British Social Attitudes Survey in 2004 
reported a rising tide of anti- immigration sentiment in Britain, with 74 per cent of 
residents wanting to see immigration reduced, up from 65 per cent in I995”- an increase 
which might have its seeds sown in the “big-bang” enlargement and sudden massive 
inflow of Polish and other ECE migrants (Geddes 2005: 730). Saggar and Somerville 
(2012: 4) argue that recent British opinion polls indicate hostility and resentment 
towards immigration: “Around three-quarters of the population are hostile to 
immigration (both legal and illegal), higher than across Europe and North America, 
making the British public an outlier”. Furthermore, they argue that the salience of 
immigration “rose significantly in the early 2000s” and before that it was not even an 
issue for debate- neither in political nor media sphere, suggesting the strong impact the 
A8 and A2 nationals perpetuated on British nationals (Saggar and Somerville 2012: 4). 
Thus, from the general British public perspective, immigration is increasingly becoming 
a matter of concern and even a source of threat and insecurity, which is also indicated 
by UKIP’s recent rise in the polls. Latest polls and ICM Research27 (n: 1990) show 
“that UKIP’s policies are favoured over those of the Tories among key Right-of-centre 
voters - particularly on immigration” (Hennessy 2013a). The most crucial category is 
the so-called “switchers”, who fluctuate between the two parties usually deciding on the 
very last moment their preference. This is a group which is crucial for Cameron to win 
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 ICM- Independent Communication and Marketing-  is a member of the British Polling Council 
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over during the next general election. In addition to “switchers”, who now seem to 
prefer UKIP’s stance on immigration to that of the Conservative Party by 62% to to 
34%, “Floating voters - those who do not express a strong preference for any party- also 
prefer the UKIP line” (Hennessy 2013a).   
Furthermore, ahead of lifting the restrictions for Bulgarian and Romanian nationals in 
2014 and “following widespread fears that the UK will be flooded with a new wave of 
immigrants, voters sent a forceful message to David Cameron stating border controls 
with Romania and Bulgaria should not be relaxed” (Meredith 2013). “Nearly eight out 
of 10 or 79 per cent of those quizzed for an opinion poll demanded visa restrictions on 
the Eastern European countries stay put” (Meredith 2013). The YouGov poll conducted 
in 2008 found that every other British national believes that there is an “immigration 
crisis” in the country, while 28% strongly agreed and 32% tended to agree with the fact 
that immigration is making Britain a more dangerous place in which to live (YouGov 
2008).  
A survey conducted by the thinktank British Future in January 2013 revealed that 
immigration is British society’s most important social problem: “One in three people 
believes tension between immigrants and people born in the UK is the major cause of 
division...Over the past two decades, both immigration and emigration have increased to 
historically high levels, with those entering the country exceeding those leaving by 
more than 100,000 in every year since 1998” (Boffey 2013).   
With regard to the election results, UKIP did not make much electoral success during 
the 2005 and 2010 general elections (gained 2.2 % and 3.1 % of the votes respectively) 
(BBC 2005; BBC 2010). The party, however, has been on a steady incline ever since 
2010 culminating with its best ever parliamentary performance at Eastleigh in February 
2013 and subsequent success in local elections gaining 25 per cent share of the total 
votes cast. This bolsters the idea that UKIP remained a marginal political force until 
2010 general election, from which it started to build its support base and exert influence 
on the Conservative Party.  
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Thus, the audience consent in the politics stream is strong on the matter of ECE 
immigration and arguably easily exploited if a coherent approach and more stringent 
measures were implemented.  
 
6. Summary  
To conclude, the research questions are answered in turn. Firstly, has the immigration 
from East and Central European countries to the UK been securitised by the 
Conservative Party and the United Kingdom Independence Party or is their rhetoric 
confined within the framework of politicisation? The study was set in the context of EU 
enlargements of 2004 and 2007 and its repercussions on the British immigration 
rhetoric.  
The theoretical framework adopted to answer this question is securitisation theory 
developed by Copenhagen School scholars in the 1990s. The idea behind the theory is 
that security is a speech-act which does “not simply describe an existing security 
situation, but brings it into being as a security situation by successfully representing it as 
such” (Williams 2003: 513). Such a measure allows securitising actors present an issue 
as existentially threatening to a referent object and thus justify the emergency measures 
opted for to tackle the problem above the domain of everyday politics. The discursive 
construction of perceptions of fear, insecurity, a heightened sense of drama and tension 
can all be considered as forms of securitising tools. If the matter is discussed as a part of 
everyday politics and these perceptions are not prevalent, the issue is confined to the 
sphere of politicisation.  
For a more productive analysis of the linguistic manufacture practiced by the two 
parties under observation, Norman Fairclough’s “three dimensional framework”  for 
critical discourse analysis was adopted. The main findings maintain that UKIP allows 
itself a more rigorous stance on the matter of ECE immigration, constructing direct 
links to crime and welfare dependency and using strong and effective language to sway 
the public opinion. Ever since UKIP grew out of its marginal position in British politics 
it has put immigration at the heart of EU debates. It maintains that Britain needs to get 
out of the EU which controls its immigration policies or otherwise there will be dire 
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consequences- an idea considered a clear indication of a securitising move by the 
original authors of the theory.  
The Conservative Party members are more confined to “political correctness” and the 
balance of language due to being in the coalition government and one of the mainstream 
parties in the country. The study did find, however, that from 2011 the Conservative 
discursive construction of ECE immigration rhetoric took a course towards a slightly 
more abrasive stance making explicit links to ECE immigrants and the possible “strain” 
and “pressure” they could pose on the British key institutions, labour market and social 
structures. On occasion, practical attempts for securitisation could be noted.  
Following Huysmans (2000) and Ibryamova (2002), the thesis argued that securitisation 
moves have mainly occurred along the lines of identity (together with traditional 
patterns of living, historical and cultural values, British exceptionalism) and welfare 
provisions by both parties. The creation of these links, however, is the outcome of  “the 
production of a truth, or the creation of knowledge through a discourse” which is 
affected by the successful manipulation of power (Ibrahim 2005: 164). The notion of 
power is an underlying dynamic of the study. It is one of the facilitating conditions of 
securitisation process, integral to the power struggle between UKIP and the 
Conservative Party in the British political terrain and an effective element in both 
Kingdon’s three streams model as well as Fairclough’s three dimensional CDA model, 
the latter of which is interested in the power of language in transforming situations.  
The thesis argues that securitisation/politicisation spectrum proposed by Buzan et al. 
(1998) should not be looked at as a binary, but rather as a threshold or a continuum 
“involving various degrees of intensity or strength” (Bourbeau 2011: 18). According to  
the original authors of the theory and their proposed nominal measurement- either 
securitisation occurs or not- the thesis would conclude that ECE immigration in Great 
Britain has not yet successfully securitised. At the same time, however, as the thesis 
applied a degree measurement suggested by some more recent publications (e.g. 
Bourbeau 2011; Salter 2011) the study concludes that UKIP generally practices its 
rhetoric just on the borderline of the securitisation sphere, occasionally falling within.  
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The problematic aspect of the study is that while UKIP’s discursive construction of  
ECE immigration rhetoric is on the borderline of securitisation, they are not represented 
in the House of Commons and therefore incapable of implementing their suggested 
policy-changes, which draws a line on their successful attempts of securitisation. On the 
other hand, the Conservative Party, who has formed a coalition government with the 
Liberal Democrats and thus have the upper hand in leading the country’s politics, 
maintains their ECE immigration discourse predominantly in the politicisation sphere, 
although recent changes in Cameron’s linguistic manufacture indicate fluctuations and 
changes in this regard.  
The second research question asked whether the Conservative Party’s discursive 
construction of immigration rhetoric is influenced by UKIP’s calls for practical 
securitisation. 
The study found that due to UKIP’s relatively marginal position in British politics up 
until the change of the governemnt in 2010 and its reputation predominantly as a protest 
party, its influence on the Conservatives before the formation of the coaliton 
government was minimal. This process, however, has been through a gradual change 
culminating with David Cameron’s immigration speech on 25 March 2013, which 
indicates clear influence exerted by the UKIP on the Conservative Party. Furthermore, 
UKIP’s electoral success, surge in opinion polls and Cameron’s recent proposal for a 
EU referendum to regain ground from UKIP all bolster the argument.  
With regard to John Kingdon’s (1984) operationalisation and conceptualisation of the 
audience and thus successful securitisation process, the study maintains that audience 
acceptance regarding ECE immigration has been received in all three streams- the 
problem, the policy and the politics- on different occasions and various circumstances. 
The problem here to be highlighted, though, is the lack of coherence with regard to the 
streams and the unequal power positions of the parties under observation for a complete 
securitisation to occur.  
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8. Kokkuvõte 
Käesoleva magistritöö eesmärgiks oli analüüsida Ida- ja Kesk-Euroopast lähtuva 
immigratsiooni julgeolekustamist Suurbritannias Euroopa Liidu laienemise kontekstis. 
Vaatluse all oli kahe poliitilise partei- Konservatiivide ja Suurbritannia Iseseisvuspartei- 
liikmete poolt diskursiivselt konstrueeritud immigratsiooniretoorika alates 2004. aastast 
kuni tänapäevani.  
Magistritöö teoreetiliseks raamistikuks on Kopenhaageni koolkonna teoreetikute Barry 
Buzani, Ole Wæveri ja Jaap de Wilde poolt loodud julgeolekustamise teooria. 
Julgeolekustamine tähistab julgeolekustaja poolt teatud küsimuste kujutamist 
eksistentsiaalselt ohtu põhjustavana. Antud küsimusega tuleb tegeleda esmajärjekorras 
ning mitte olema sealjuures piiratud normaalpoliitikat raamistavate reeglite poolt 
(Buzan et al. 1998).  
Julgeolekustamise sektoreid on Buzani, Wæveri ja de Wilde käsitluses viis- lisaks 
varasemale domineerivale militaarsektorile on ühe enam kõneainet pakkunud ka 
poliitiline, majanduslik, keskkonna ja sotsiaalne sektor, millest viimane on käesoleva 
uurimustöö keskseks lähtepunktiks. 
Buzan jt (1998) määratlevad ka julgeoleku kontseptuaalse raamistiku ning selgitavad 
mingi küsimuse politiseerimise ja julgeolekustamise erinevust. Antud töö raames on 
oluline märkida, et julgeolekustamine on Kopenhaageni koolkonna järgi “ekstreemne 
versioon politiseerimisest”, mis liigutab poliitika oma tavalistest raamidest väljapoole 
ning õigustab “hädaabivahendite” kasutuselevõttu (Buzan et al. 1998: 23-24). 
Uurimustöös on aga vaieldud, et algset julgeolekustamise/politiseerimise skaalat ei saa 
vaadelda läbi rangelt piiritletud grupeeringute, vaid pigem üksteist katva ja kohati 
seguneva kontiinumina. See lubab järeldada, et Suurbritannia kahe vaatluse all oleva 
poliitilise partei immigratsiooniretoorika ei ole surutud kindlatesse raamidsse, vaid 
muutub ajas ja kontekstis. 
Julgeolekustamise teooria eripäraks on tema intersubjektiivne loomus, mis tähendab, et 
eduka julgeolekustamise puhul aktsepteerib auditoorium kõneakti. Siin on olulisel kohal 
veenmis- ja argumenteerimisstrateegia; kui auditoorium mõistab ohu määratlust ja 
kiidab heaks vastumeetmed, võib väita, et julgeolekustamine on edukalt lõpule viidud 
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(Buzan et al. 1998). Auditooriumi kontseptsioon on aga üks teooria kõige vähem 
väljaarendatud ideesid (vt nt Salter 2008; Roe 2008; Balzacq 2011). Originaalautorid ei 
määratle, kellest auditoorium koosneb või kuidas peaks auditooriumipoolne 
julgeolekuohu aktsepteerimine toimuma. Siinkohal lähtuti John Kingdoni “kolme 
hoovuse mudelist”, kelle arvates ei ole auditoorium üks ühtne grupp, vaid koosneb 
erinevatest osadest, mis kõik vastavad veenmistaktikatele erinevalt (Kingdon 1984). 
Selle käsitluse järgi võib julgeolekustamist pidada edukaks kui see on aktsepteeritud nii 
probleemi, poliisi kui poliitika harudes, kus on auditooriumiks vastavalt näiteks 
poliitiline eliit, parteiliikmed ja valitsus; spetsialistid, tehnokraadid ja mõttekodade 
analüütikud; ning avalik arvamus.   
Julgeolekustamise teooriast lähtuvalt on oluline ka märkida, et kõne all olev 
julgeolekuoht ei pea olema reaalne, vaid võib olla sellena vaid presenteeritud, et 
õigustada teatud vastumeetmete kasutuselevõttu (Buonfino 2004a; Buzan et al. 1998). 
See on oluline, sest kõneakt ei kanna endas lihtsalt informatsiooni eksisteeriva 
julgeolekusituatsiooni kohta, vaid on performatiivne konstrueering iseeneses ja seetõttu 
märkimisväärse kaaluga julgeolekuanalüüsis. Siinkohal on julgeolekuohtude 
lingvistiline atribuutika analüüsi keskmeks- milliseid sõnu, kõnekujundeid, metafoore, 
termineid ja keelelisi omapärasid on kasutatud. Selleks on kasutatud Norman Fairclough 
poolt loodud kolme dimensioonilist mudelit, mis keskendub vastavalt diskursuse 
keelelisele ülesehitusele, diskursiivsele praktikale ehk kuidas on kõneaktid 
aktsepteeritud (tugevas korrelatsioonis julgeolekuteooria auditooriumikesksusega) ning 
sotsiaalsele praktikale ehk võimule, ideoloogiale ja kontekstile (Fairclough 1992; 
Fairclough 1995). Viimane on eriti oluline, sest Kopenhaageni koolkonna idee järgi ei 
saa julgeolekut käsitleda kui “analüütiliselt eelfikseeritud objektiivset nähtust”; 
julgeolek sõltub tema tõlgenduskeskkonnast ja sotsiaalsetest protsessidest (Williams 
2003: 513). Seetõttu on oluline osa tööst pühendatud Suurbritannia ajaloolise, 
kultuurilise ja sotsiaalpoliitilise tausta uurimiseks, mille raames on praegusi poliitilisi 
arenguid ja julgeolekustavaid diskursusi ning praktikaid tulemuslikum analüüsida.  
Julgeolekustamise edukas toimimine on tugevas korrelatsioonis julgeolekustaja 
positsiooniga. Sellise lähenemise juured on pärit realistlikust traditsioonist, mis põhineb 
võimujaotusel ja sellest lähtuval tulemil- mida suurem on julgeolekustaja 
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sotsiaalne/poliitiline võim ja positsioon, seda tõenäolisemalt osutub julgeolekustamine 
edukaks (Buzan et al. 1998). Seetõttu on uurimustöö keskmes Suurbritannia poliitikute 
ja valitsuse immigratsiooni diskursiivne konstruktsioon.  
Julgeolekustamine keskendub välistele mõjutajatele, pigem kui sisemistele poliitilistele 
ja sotsiaalsetele protsessidele. Huysmans (2006) väidab, et ühiskonnas tuleb kõigepealt 
soodustada ebakindluse levikut ja hirmu oma väärtuste ning identiteedi üle, et 
kindlustada ühtsustunnet diskursiivselt konstrueeritud eksistentsiaalse ohu ees. Sellest 
ideest lähtudes tõstatati kaks peamist uurimusküsimust: esiteks, kas Ida-ja Kesk- 
Euroopast lähtuva immigratsiooni julgeolekustamine on Suurbritannias aset leidnud 
Konservatiivide ja Suurbritannia Iseseisvuspartei liikmete ja poliitilise eliidi käsitluses; 
ning teiseks, kas Konservatiivide immigratsiooniretoorika on mõjutatud UKIP-i 
poolsetest mõjudest ja üleskutsetest praktilisele julgeolekustamisele.  
Kokkuvõtteks võib väita, et UKIP-i mõju Briti poliitikas oli suhteliselt marginaalne 
kuni valitsusevahetuseni 2010. aastal. Konservatiivide võimulesaamisega aga hakkasid 
poliitilisel maastikul toimuma ka olulised muudatused. Riigi majanduslik olukord, 
kasvav tööpuudus, seda eriti noorte seas, ning laiem institutsiooniline raamistik ja 
suhted Euroopa Liiduga tekitasid UKIP-ile soodsa pinnase oma sõnumi edastamiseks. 
Sagenev Euroopa Liidu ja sellest lähtuva immigratsiooni vastane retoorika kogus üha 
enam kõlapinda, mis avaldus järjest kasvavas toetuses rahva seas, kulmineerudes UKIP-
i jaoks tohutu eduga 2013. aasta kohalikel valimistel. UKIP-i reputatsioon kui ainult 
protestipartei on kadumas ning see on omakorda hakanud muret tekitama 
valitsuskoalitsioonile ning peamiselt Konservatiividele, kes UKIP-i edust ajendatuna on 
adopteerinud karmima immigratsiooniretoorika ning eesotsas peaminister David 
Cameroniga välja pakkunud Euroopa Liidu referendumi, et UKIP-ile kaotatud 
valijaskond enne 2015. aasta üldvalimisi oma leeridesse tagasi meelitada. 
Lisaks leidis uurimustöö, et Suurbritannia Iseseisvuspartei on Ida- ja Kesk-Euroopast 
lähtuva immigratsiooni julgeolekustamise piirimail ning seda eriti viimasel ajal, sest 
tuleva aasta algusel kaovad piirangud tööjõu liikumisele Bulgaariast ja Rumeeniast. 
Kuigi Iseseisvuspartei mõju Konservatiividele on märkimisväärne, on viimased siiski 
jäänud pigem politiseerimise sfääri toetudes poliitkorrektsusele ja lingvistilisele 
tasakaalule. 
